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ABSTRACT 
POSTWAR SIERRA LEONE: ARE PROGRAMS OF RECONSTRUCTION 
ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF THE WAR? 
Lovetta A. Thompson 
June 10,2010 
This multilayered study is an appraisal of some of the ongoing post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone in light of the causes of the conflict, which lasted 
from 1991-2002. It begins by providing a critical examination of the historical 
antecedents leading up to the war. The problems of colonialism which brought together 
different nationalities under one political umbrella by force of arm, along with other 
motley of issues such as corrupt leadership and inter-ethnic violence led to the outbreak 
of war in 1991. Although different studies have discussed these factors, very few, if any, 
have tried to make a connection between causation and reconstruction with a view to find 
a lasting peace. The aim of the study, therefore, is to appraise the ongoing post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone in light of the causes of the conflict. No lasting 
peace will be achieved unless there are practical steps addressing the very structures that 
brought about the war. A central focus is to gain some insights on the successes and 
failures of the ongoing reconstruction programs. The findings of the study conclude that 
the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone have been moderately successful 
at best. If basic needs such as educational and health care reform, as well as employment 
opportunities for youth are not met, Sierra Leone will continue to carry a cloud where 
conditions are still ripe for conflict. 
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Background and Purpose of Study 
This study examines the major post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone 
with a view to assess their successes and failures in light of the major factors that brought 
about the civil conflict lasting between 1991-2002. While there has been extensive 
research conducted on what caused the protracted violence in the country, very little is 
known about how effective the ongoing programs of reconstruction are addressing the 
causes in order for the country to not relapse into violence again. The study illustrates 
that avoiding renewed violence is one of the foremost tasks facing postwar reconstruction 
programs, organizations, politicians, and theorists. While the Reconciliation Commission 
on the war submitted in its 2004 Report that "bad governance, endemic corruption, and 
denial of basic human rights created deplorable conditions that made conflict 
inevitable,"\ other causes such as issues pertaining to youth marginalization, which was 
also mentioned as one of the primary causes by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, have remained largely neglected, particularly by the Sierra Leone 
government.2 Recently, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, while lauding 
\ Final Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume. 1, 
October 2004, 10. 
2 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report: Volume 2 (October 
2004),30. 
1 
the progress Sierra Leone has made within the past eight years, identifies the need to 
create opportunities for young people and improvements in education as crucial 
challenges that must be met? With that, this study takes the view that programs of 
reconstruction need to take into consideration all of the major causes of the conflict in 
order for lasting peace to be achieved. If all of these issues are not addressed in their 
entirety, there will always be a possibility for recurring violence-the such that for years 
threatened the very foundations of the country to reoccur. 
In 1991, the small West African nation of Sierra Leone, located between Guinea 
and Liberia, was plunged into a brutal civil war that left an enduring legacy of political 
instability and economic devastation. It all began when on March 23, 1991, a group of 
approximately one hundred fighters comprising Sierra Leonean dissidents, Liberian 
fighters loyal to former President Charles Taylor of Liberia, and a small band of 
mercenaries from Burkina Faso invaded eastern Sierra Leone at Bomaru, Kailahun 
District.4 The group that called itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) advanced a 
vaguely populist agenda of fighting against the corrupt and inept government of President 
Joseph Momoh and his business associates in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone.5 
Momoh had led a dubious regime that exploited the country of its natural resources for 
personal gains. With 2002 marking the end of the war, best remembered today as the 
"Diamond Conflict," it became necessary for the nation to address the residual effects of 
the war. Herein lays one justification for a study of this nature and scope. 
3 AllAfrica.com, "Sierra Leone: Ban Lauds Country's Advances in Firming Up 
Stability," June 15 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201006151292.html. 
4 John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 2001), 31. 
5 Sahr Kpundeh, Corruption and Political Insurgency (Dakar: CODES RIA 2004), 90-91. 
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At the commencement of the attack on Bomaru in 1991, the RUF presented no 
concrete program of action or revolutionary agenda. Rather, prior to the assault, the RUF 
had circulated in Sierra Leone its so-called Basic Document, which contained a message 
that criticized the neo-colonialist character of the Momoh administration. Lacking a solid 
political platform, the rebel propaganda failed to attract meaningful support from the 
people of Sierra Leone. In an apparently desperate act of frustration, the RUF responded 
with indiscriminate violence against women, children, and at times, whole communities.6 
This initial attack was the first among many that turned Sierra Leone into a lawless nation 
and thus, resulted in a coup led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
While the AFRC were opposed to the RUF, they did not necessarily support the ruling 
government. Rather, the rise of the AFRC quickly turned the conflict into three factions, 
as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a traditional militia banded together on the side of the 
government to restore democratic rule. The war continued for a decade, lasting until 
January 18,2002. 
Having quickly taken control of some of the diamond mines, the RUF became a 
major stakeholder in the conflict, and they sustained the war with profits from illegal 
mining of Sierra Leone's diamonds. Their utilization of diamonds-the most valuable 
natural resource in the country-for weapons trade and profit attracted much 
international attention to the processes of mining and the trading of diamonds. It should 
be noted, however, that some scholars have argued that diamonds were not the only 
6 Hirsch, Diamonds and the Struggle, 26; Kpundeh, Corruption and Political Insurgency, 
264. 
3 
motivating factor for the war, despite the United States media's popularization of its 
Prior to the war's end in 2002, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) general purpose was to collaborate with the Sierra Leone government and 
other parties in implementing peace agreements between the Sierra Leone government 
and the RUF. UNAMSIL has been criticized for placing its policy of "national recovery 
and economic and social development" last on its proposed plan.8 Nevertheless, the 
UNAMSIL program has been a success story. But the world body would not have 
intervened toward the end of the conflict without the initiatives of the Nigerian-led 
Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), a regional body that called for an 
intervention in the war through its ceasefire-monitoring group, ECOMOG. The move 
taken by ECOW AS governments would result in the restoration of constitutional legality 
and reinstatement of the government of the democratically elected President.9 ECOMOG 
faced similar issues in Sierra Leone in 1998 as it had in its attempts to end violence in 
Liberia in 1990. However, the organization has been criticized by the Global Policy 
Forum for losing sight of its initial purpose and rather, becoming another faction of 
armed fighters in the war. IO 
7 Lisa Denney, "Explaining War, Creating Peace: UK-Sponsored Reforms in Sierra 
Leone," Contemporary Review (Summer 2009): 154. 
8 Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: the Story of UNAMSIL (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers: 2008),40. 
9 Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 45. 
10 Global Policy Forum, "Lessons of Sierra Leone Intervention," Security Council Issues 
(May 19, 1998): 2. 
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Statement of the Problem 
One of the most pressing issues facing post -conflict societies is the question of 
effective, successful reconstruction programs. Efficient implementations of programs that 
have a primary goal of tackling causes of war are needed in order for lasting peace to be 
achieved. The extant studies on the post-conflict reconstruction programs in Sierra Leone 
have so far failed to present the ways in which the policies and programs of 
reconstruction in the postwar context are addressing root causes of the war. For example, 
despite several studies of the post-conflict reconstruction programs, there is little or no 
attention paid to which strategies have been successful in establishing an infrastructure 
for sound democratic governance in the country in light of the causes of the war. The 
objective of this study is essentially threefold. In order to assess the relevance of the 
post-conflict reconstruction programs, this study will first present the background history 
of Sierra Leone, highlighting key historical features of the country's pre-colonial, 
colonial, and postcolonial eras. Providing an overview of the history will illuminate an 
understanding of how the country's colonial legacy played an important role in its 
postcolonial politics that essentially led up to the war. Then the study will reexamine the 
remote and proximate causes of the war-that is, those problems that had begun to 
accumulate since independence in 1961. Reexamining causation will give light to the 
various theories about what caused the war that have been put forth by scholars, and draw 
appropriate and accurate conclusions. Finally, the study will assess the ongoing post-
conflict reconstruction efforts aimed at restoring peace and stability to the country 
consistent with democratic governance. The background of the study will provide a solid 
5 
context in which the main challenges the war has posed to the country's political, social, 
and economic future will be evaluated. 
Since Sierra Leone was once a British colony, it would be illogical to ignore any 
possible nexus between colonial rule and the country's postcolonial condition of 
instability. Colonial rule in Sierra Leone sought to unite a country with a diversity of 
ethnic peoples through authoritarian rather than democratic methods. Colonial rule 
entrenched its autocratic political culture. 11 Although some recent studies have alluded to 
this feature of causation, few, if any, have factored it into the ongoing reconstruction 
efforts aimed at creating a sustainable political peace and economic development within 
the framework of democratic governance. The findings of this study will be useful to 
policymakers and stakeholders involved in Sierra Leone because it will help them to 
refine their strategies and maximize available resources in order to achieve the goal of 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
Research Approach/Methodology 
The research design is to establish a relationship between causes of the war and 
the appropriateness of post -conflict reconstruction programs in order to predict the 
likelihood of political stability or the chances of a future war. The study holds the 
assumption that reconstruction programs need to address all of the root causes of war. 
Because one of the general outcomes of the study is to add to the discourse already 
produced, it looks at the existing literature on the history, causes, and programs in regards 
to the future of Sierra Leone. Sources of information for this will include the utilization 
of primary materials like archival materials, newspapers, government gazettes, and 
11 Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (Lanham: 
University Press of America, Inc. 1997),9. 
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personal journals produced over the period of conflict and reconstruction, as well as oral 
accounts from participants and victims of the war. Other major sources of information 
include secondary materials in forms of textbooks, monographs, journal essays, and other 
similar materials. The approach consists of an analytical and comprehensive examination 
of the various aspects and dimensions of the conflict, challenges, and post-conflict 
measures. 
It must, however, be conceded that at least one limitation to this study does exist, 
relating to the location of the area of study. Because the people-that is those who the 
said programs are targeting (i.e. youth, former combatants, and arguably the entire Sierra 
Leone populace) ultimately determines the success of a program, this study could benefit 
a great deal from interviews of people inside Sierra Leone, the ideal group to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their programs. Employing the personal interview method would allow 
the people of Sierra Leone to be active agents, and give them voices since they are often 
left out of the literature. These people are the ones directly affected by the ongoing 
programs and policies. Not having access to this population from Kentucky is a problem 
Hence, I attempted to address by documenting and examining the extensive literature on 
the various political, social, economic and related aspects of the war. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with Sierra Leonean officials and expatriates in the United 
States who were willing to answer questions about policies of reconstruction addressing 
causes of the conflict. These top officials and citizens were able to present information 
on the immediate postwar condition and some of the various programs on the ground 
(particularly UNAMSIL) and governmental policies. Because the interviews were 
historical in nature, and did not involve questions related to personal conducts in the war, 
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the interviewees did not constitute human subjects of research and thus the research was 
exempt from the Institutional Review Board. Nonetheless, it should be noted that one 
flaw of the interview method in this case is the biases of interviewees, especially those 
who are not a part of the general civilian population and were possibly affected 
differently by the war. Some of these biases include the variety of perspectives brought 
by interviewees because of varied experiences. For example, individuals who were raped 
during the conflict, young children forced into fighting, or those that fled before the 
fighting began can all bring different accounts and insights. 
Generally, information on the historical background of Sierra Leone was 
substantially drawn from the copious secondary sources in forms of books and journal 
articles. Because the historical timeline is important to understanding this study, the 
utilization of books and scholarly articles was inevitable. One of the foremost scholars 
who conducted research on Sierra Leone's political history, particularly in the 
postcolonial context, was Martin Kilson. He also conducted field research in Sierra 
Leone during that time period. Much of Kilson' s pioneering research included primary 
sources, and this study particularly used his work Political Change in a West African 
State to interpret and analyze the historical precedents to the war. Other sources that are 
included in this section are David Keen's Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone and 
Bankole Thompson's The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone, both of which 
look to Kilson's research as well. 
The section on causes of conflict is reliant upon available primary sources, but 
more reliant on the use of secondary sources. A host of literature has been produced 
since the beginning of the war. Robert Kaplan in his Atlantic Monthly article "The 
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Coming Anarchy," and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in their paper "Greed and 
Grievance," were among the first to theorize as to what caused the civil war in Sierra 
Leone. The use of secondary sources in the sections on causation and post-conflict 
reconstruction is important in order to locate and interpret the war within the mainstream 
literature in a theoretical fashion. Reliance on these sources illustrates the wealth of 
research that has been conducted on the causes of conflict post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts. The void this study intends to fill, however, is to examine the existing literature 
and find trends that connect the reconstruction efforts to the causes of conflict. 
After examining the causes of the civil war, and the challenges posed by the 
conflict, and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts and strategies, the study reviews the 
extant literature on the subject of post-conflict reconstruction programs in order to predict 
whether a future relapse to war is likely. This section relies largely upon primary sources 
such as official reports and policy brief. Others materials like Reports from Amnesty 
International, International Crisis Group Africa and the UN Secretary General, as well as 
official documents from the African Union and West Africa Early Warning and Response 
Network (WARN) were used because they provided firsthand accounts of some of the 
programs that were on the ground during the postwar period. The goal remains to fill a 
gap in the previous studies-that is to ascertain the relevance of the ongoing post-conflict 
efforts for a more lasting peace in Sierra Leone. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two is designed to be a general political history of Sierra Leone from the 
colonial era to the postcolonial era. It is divided into sections that explore the founding 
of the nation known today as Sierra Leone as a British post-abolitionist province of 
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freedom. It highlights the unique colonial history of the country; the discovery of 
diamonds and the years leading up to decolonization; the immediate postcolonial era, its 
social, political, and economic disparities; the declaration of a one-party system and years 
of kleptocratic governance and misrule; and the emergence of the RUF. 
Chapter three is a theoretical review of the prevalent literature of causes of war in 
Africa, with specific emphasis on Sierra Leone. It highlights the convergence of a very 
complex record of issues some scholars have variously identified as "greed and 
grievance," "inherent barbarism," corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, 
ethnic and political identity, structural violence and the social exclusion of basic needs 
resulting in marginalization, and the contagion of political conflict. 
Chapter four also provides a theoretical review of the available literature and 
concepts on what constitutes the discourse and practice of post-conflict reconstruction. It 
emphasizes the necessity of development practitioners and policymakers, specifically in 
the postwar context, to focus on the causes of war if sustainable peace is to be attained. 
Chapter five examines several of the ongoing post-conflict reconstruction 
programs in Sierra Leone. By way of post-conflict reconstruction, several organizations 
and peacekeeping projects were either established or sent to Sierra Leone to address the 
problems caused by the civil war and alleviate the resulting hardships. Two of the more 
high profile organizations include the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Humanitarian organizations such as Global Witness and International Crisis Group were 
at the forefront of relief efforts during and after the African conflict, with the United 
Nations as the leading organization. 
10 
---------------------------------------------
Chapter six, the final chapter of the study, is focused on the prospects for a 
peaceful, stable and democratic Sierra Leone. It is devoted to the analysis of specific 
programs of reconstruction and governmental policies, and examines how well they have 
addressed the causes of war. Specifically addressed are issues pertaining to corruption, 
youth unemployment, educational and health reform to indicate their position within the 




This chapter provides a concise historical survey of Sierra Leone and its political 
development from the pre-colonial period through the colonial and the postcolonial 
period and to the eve of the outbreak of civil war in 1991. Such history is important to 
appreciating fully the social dynamics of the country, particularly after it was granted 
independence from Great Britain in 1961. Oftentimes in the discussion surrounding 
identifying causes of war, what is initially explored are the problems that arise at that 
time. However, Sierra Leone's civil war was the result of a number of issues, which 
were a direct result of its colonial experience. This chapter argues that understanding the 
historical antecedents to the war provides a holistic view of the dynamics that led to the 
eruption of violence. Several themes emerge in this chapter that illustrates colonial 
factors that were prevalent after independence leading up to the war. They include: 
• Ethnicity: this led to the rise of the indigenous elites through indirect rule 
as well as the creation of a new ethnic group, the krio elite, 
• Centralization: sociopolitical and economic power was concentrated in 
the capital of Freetown during colonialism and after independence. 
• Economy: a shift in the mode of economic development occurred, from a 
largely agricultural sector to diamonds upon their discovery. 
12 
Ironically, each of these themes/events occurred subsequent to one another, and 
continued long after decolonization. The creation of ethnic identities that led to a 
hierarchy resulted in the centralization of power in Freetown, where the krio elites were 
located. Upon the discovery of diamonds, profits from these revenues were centralized 
among the elites, and exported to benefit outside businesses. Hence, David Keen rightly 
states that understanding Sierra Leone's war means understanding its history and the 
. . d 12 gnevances It generate . 
The Founding of a "Free" Nation 
The country that is known today as Sierra Leone has interacted with European 
explorers since the 15th century. The country was discovered and given its name by 
Portuguese traders in 1462, and the Dutch, French, and British followed suit in the 
business of trading African people. 13 The colonial experience is believed to have begun, 
however, when in 1787, Freetown, the small enclave that would later become the capital 
of Sierra Leone, was established as a settlement for freed slaves after a group of British 
philanthropists purchased the land near Bunce Island. 14 The idea was to create a 
"province of freedom" for ex-slaves, particularly the "poor blacks" of Europe, along with 
white settlers. ls The Black Poor were a free, but marginalized group of Africans living in 
12 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: PALGRAVE,2005), 
2. 
13 Suzanne LeVert, Cultures of the World: Sierra Leone (New York: Marshall Cavendish 
Benchmark, 2007), 22; A. B. C. Sibthorpe, The History of Sierra Leone (London: Frank 
Cass and Company Limited), 7. 
14 Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most 
Precious Stones (Westview Press, 2002), 28-31. 
IS Morten Boas, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial 
Rule," Third World Quarterly (October 2001), 705. 
13 
London, and the English philanthropists sought a solution for them. 16 In May of 1787 a 
total of 411 settlers (including whites and blacks from Britain) arrived in the province of 
freedom.17 Hirsch contends that the establishment of Freetown as a British frontier 
marked the beginning of the colonial era in this region. 18 Within a month of their arrival, 
however, the settlement was burned down by a Temne chief in retaliation for the earlier 
burning of one of his towns by a British warship. 19 Thus, the initial settlement of this 
area was met with resistance to what was seen as an oppressive alien intrusion. This 
would be the story of Sierra Leone's development for years to come. 
Despite this early resistance, the British were determined to establish a more 
formally organized colony. Following the founding of the colony by Granville Sharpe, a 
British philanthropist, control of the settlement was granted by Charter to the Court of 
Directors by the Sierra Leone Company in London.2o In 1791, the Sierra Leone 
Company garnered support from the British government to transport a group of blacks 
living in Nova Scotia, Canada. It was not until the arrival of the additional 1200 free 
blacks of Nova Scotia along with five hundred more from Jamaica in 1792 that Freetown 
was formally settled, and given its name.21 Until 1808, the settlement was characterized 
by rebellion, war and financial disasters. In order to bring about political stability, the 
16 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 705. 
17 John Peterson, Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1969), 7. 
18 John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 23. 
19 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 705. 
20 Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (Lanham: 
University Press of America, Inc. 1997), 1. 
21 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 705-706; Campbell, Blood Diamonds, 29. 
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British government took over responsibility for the settlement in 1808, and it was 
declared a crown colony in that same year. 
Between 1808 and 1864, the original group of black settlers merged with a large 
number of Africans rescued from slave ships, reaching a number of roughly 70,000.22 
The Freetown settlers became known as the krio ethnic group, who modeled their 
governance after the colonial administration. This resulted in a cultural product that was 
more Afro-European than any other groups in that region. As a result, the Anglicized krio 
elite socially, culturally, and economically dominated Freetown.23 The social position of 
the krio remained largely unchallenged until the British government declared a 
Protectorate over the entire country in 1896.24 
While the krio dominated Freetown, the provinces were comprised of a diverse 
group of societies and political entities. Barrows describes this as a center-periphery 
dynamic.25 Freetown, as Sierra Leone's urban metropolis and home to the country's 
most elite group was the center; whereas the rural area where groups such as the Mende, 
Temne, Vai and so forth inhabited with lesser political pull than the center were the 
periphery.26 However, the rural groups were not to be left out of colonial business for 
long, especially when the Protectorate was established. 
22 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 705; Hirsch, Diamonds and the Struggle 
for Democracy, 23. 
23 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 705; Hirsch, Diamonds and the Struggle 
for Democracy, 23; Pham, The Global Dimensions of an African Civil Conflict, 179. 
24 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 706; Campbell, Blood Diamonds, 30-31 
25 Walter Barrows, Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development 
in Sierra Leone (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), 1. 
26 Walter Barrows, Grassroots Politics in an African State, 1. 
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The British implemented a form of governance called the indirect rule system, 
which was a method of colonial administration that used African chiefs as middlemen.27 
Sierra Leone, then, is the product of an amalgamation of two separate colonial-era 
components, the Crown Colony of Freetown and the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, each of 
which came to independence with individual colonial experiences.28 This divergence is 
important in understanding Sierra Leone's political development, set in place by British 
colonial rule. 
To add another dynamic, the Protectorate itself was a mixture of the indirect rule 
system through paramount chiefs and other traditional rulers. The chiefdom has been 
described as having two political functions. The first being the foundation of civil 
society, and the chief acting in the best interests of his people; and the second as the 
lowest component of the British administration.29 These factors could be mutually 
reinforcing or contradictory because the chief was met with the daunting task of 
maintaining a balance between traditional rule and colonial rule. This new role exercised 
through the chiefdoms would diminish the importance and dominance of the krio elite. 
The British colonial administration was mainly concerned with obtaining and 
exploiting agricultural, material, and human resources of the area when they declared a 
Protectorate over the provinces?O To some extent, the krio, who by default had become 
the educated elite among Freetown society, rendered parts of the rural lands 
27 Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization 
Process in Sierra Leone (Atheneum: Harvard University Press, 1969),24. 
28 J. Peter Pham, The Global Dimensions of an African Civil Conflict from Child 
Soldiersk Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leone Tragedy (New 
York: Nova Sciences Publishers Inc, 2005), 179. 
29 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 706; John R. Cartwright, Political 
Leadership in Sierra Leone (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1978),35. 
30 Kilson, Political Change, 14. 
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commercially exploitable as wel1. 31 Boas argues that this aspect of Sierra Leone's 
colonial history fostered a rivalry between two groups, the krio versus local chiefs. The 
end result of all these factors was Sierra Leone not being a united nation when 
independence was granted in 1961. It was "handicapped by its lack of national identity," 
and patron-client relations that were characteristic of the state in the country's 
postcolonial era were firmly set in place?2 
In addition to the ethnic social chasms that developed during Sierra Leone's 
colonial era, British rule created a pattern of economic development based on the 
extraction of unprocessed raw materials such as agricultural products, iron ore and 
diamonds. Raw materials were channeled out and manufactured goods were imported, 
resulting in a lack of industrial development and limited government stimulation for the 
rural economy?3 
The Discovery of Diamonds and Decolonization 
The discovery of diamonds in 1930 did not bring about much development for 
Sierra Leone because its profits were not used as a direct mode of economic development 
for the country. The country did, however, rely on the resource for its economic base 
because people were soon leaving the agricultural sector that had dominated the economy 
for so long, for the diamond mines. Soon thereafter, the diamond trade had taken over. 
Prior to the discovery of the precious minerals, the country was dependent upon the 
agricultural sector as its chief source of export earnings. However, when diamonds came 
into the picture, the alluvial mineral overshadowed the agricultural economy, and by 
31 Kilson, Political Change, 14. 
32 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 707; Pham, The Global Dimensions of an 
African Conflict, 180. 
33 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 8. 
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1960, provided sixty percent of the value of Sierra Leone's exports.34 As a result, 
diamonds played a major role both in the prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 
devastation of the war in recent years.35 From the beginning, the government was unable 
or unwilling to control the wealth for the benefit of its citizens.36 Due to the unearthing 
of diamonds in Sierra Leone's Kono District under the umbrella of British colonial rule, 
the profits from extraction benefited outside parties. However, the major mining deposits 
were located in the country's rural lands, bringing about questions as to who owned the 
region. The British used the Protectorate years earlier to their advantage. In 1935, the 
British-owned Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a De Beers subsidiary, was granted a 
ninety-nine year monopoly over diamond mining in the country.37 This resulted in the 
privatization of the public sector (i.e. natural resources), but not without the imposition of 
other external actors. For example, with the initial discovery of diamonds came 
Lebanese traders and businessmen who set up shop in the Kono District where the 
diamond mines were located.38 These factors were seen as contributing to the "business 
of conflict" that the country's postcolonial era would experience?9 
34 John R. Cartwright, Political Leadership in Sierra Leone (Buffalo: University of 
Chicago), 34. 
35 William Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State: the Roots and Future of Violent 
Conflict in Sierra Leone" International Politics and Society 2 (2003): 48. 
36 Campbell, Blood Diamonds, 2. 
37 Rasna Warah, "lllicit Diamonds: Africa's Curse" (November 2004),20; Hirsch, 
Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 27; 
38 Warah, "lllicit Diamonds," 21. 
39 Tom Nevin, "The Business of Conflict, The Conflict of Business," African Business 
(July 2005): 21. 
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This notion of "striking it rich" in the diamond mines was not only shared by 
external actors, but the people of Sierra Leone as wel1.4o As mentioned, the diamond 
mines drew a lot of workers away from the agricultural sector, which used to be the 
mainstay of Sierra Leone's economy. From the 1930s onwards, the "scramble" for 
diamonds foreshadowed any plans for a diversified economic development as revenues 
from diamonds sales represented an important component of Sierra Leone's economy. 
Arguably, the "conflict" element of diamonds began here because the country as an entity 
did not benefit much; rather, individuals and groups in and out of the country reaped 
greater profits. Despite Sierra Leone being home to one of West Africa's most valuable 
diamond deposits (that would over the next few decades produce roughly 50 million 
carats of diamonds), the country rarely reaped much benefit from its exports".41 The 
development that the country initially saw during the years leading up to independence 
would take a drastic tum after 1961. For that reason, one may assert that Sierra Leone's 
history exemplifies a sort of contradiction because prior to independence, the livelihood 
of the masses seemed to fare better than in the postcolonial era. The pattern of 
centralizing public commodities within the context of the state would be repeated in the 
immediate postcolonial era. 
Sociopolitical and Economic Disparities in the Postcolonial Era 
The characteristics of the sociopolitical and economic development did not 
significantly alter after independence in 1961. The generation of African elite that 
emerged during the colonial administration replaced the colonial oligarchy. The 1951 
40 J. A. Grant, "Diamonds, Foreign Aid, and the Uncertain Prospects for Post-conflict 
Reconstruction in Sierra Leone" Round Table (September 2005): 451. 
41 Campbell, Blood Diamonds, 9. 
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Constitution provided a framework for decolonization, and after successful constitutional 
talks in London in 1960, Sir Milton Margai became Prime Minister. Thus, the shared 
political ideology of the African elite and the expatriate group, that is, the colonial 
administrators, was carried over into the postcolonial period.42 For instance, mining 
companies and industries continued to have poor linkages with the rest of the economy. 
Another element of continuity between colonial and independent Sierra Leone was the 
predominantly undemocratic mode of governance.43 The political continuities of 
centralization were also apparent as the undemocratic colonial system was followed by 
almost two decades of what was effectively a one-party state from 1973 to the military 
coup in 1992.44 The extractive economy and corrupt and autocratic political system 
appeared to be mutually reinforcing. In effect, the central government, both before and 
after independence, lacked the resources to fund a disciplined bureaucracy. Sierra 
Leone's history from independence in 1961 to the outbreak of violence resulting in the 
civil war in 1991 in essence foreshadowed the path of violence that would eventually 
engulf the country. 
The postcolonial politics of Sierra Leone added another dynamic to the country's 
social milieu. The emergence of political parties among the krio ethnic group and 
"creolized" elite (chiefs) dominated the dimension of political parties.45 It has been 
argued that ethnicity played a role in political party affiliation as well as the election of 
42 Kilson, Political Change, 176. 
43 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 8-9. 
44 Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the 
Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone," The Journal of Modern African Studies (June 
1998): 206; Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 9; Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 
11; Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 12; Thompson, Constitutional History and Law of 
Sierra Leone, 145-175. 
45 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 707. 
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cabinet members into certain administrations.46 Following independence when Sir 
Milton Margai became the country's first Prime Minister, he represented the Sierra Leone 
People's Party (SLPP). The SLPP, founded in 1951, was the first legitimate political 
party in Sierra Leone, and primarily drew its membership from one of the two dominant 
ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the Mende.47 The SLPP claimed to be a national party that 
transcended regional and linguistic distinctions, and included some Krio as well as 
Temne among its rank and file.48 After suffering months of illness, Margai died while in 
office in 1964, and was succeeded by his brother Albert. The new leader continued the 
old practice of allotting political positions to his ethnic Mende people. 
Meanwhile, the All People's Congress (APC), founded in 1960, drew more of its 
supporters from the Temne ethnic group. The APC was a movement that appealed to a 
wide range of dissidents, including young people who felt that they had been 
marginalized by the government. The marginalization of youth that resulted in political 
mobilization was a feat that would be repeated in the rebel war, for the RUF was largely 
comprised of youth, both active and forced participants. The general consensus among 
APC supporters was that they had received the "short end of the stick" in regards to 
distribution and exchange of political and economic benefits.49 The APC won the 
elections in 1967 with Siaka Stevens as the head. Stevens was able to secure power 
because, prior to independence, the SLPP (with which he was originally affiliated) sought 
to decentralize the power the Krio elite had in governance for well over a century. 
46 Jimmy D. Kandeh, "Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone," African Studies 
Review (April 1992),81. 
47 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 707; Pham, The Global Dimensions of an 
African Conflict, 183. 
48 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 707. 
49 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 707. 
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However, as mentioned, the SLPP chose to accommodate those primarily of the Mende 
ethnic group. As a result, Stevens and others formed the APC, a party that was to be 
inclusive of all ethnic groups. 
Kleptocratic Governance, Misrule, and a War Brewing in the Provinces 
Siaka Stevens at times referred to himself and the APC Party as socialist, 
following a common ideology held by some African nationalists in the context of 
decolonization and the immediate postcolonial era. However, this populist agenda that 
the APC and Stevens purported soon proved to be a front for dishonest political reasons, 
and was not realized. Stevens' declaration as 'president for life' in Sierra Leone resulted 
in a centralized state and the eventual declaration of a one-party state in 1978 by the 
APC.50 The APC created a political atmosphere in which free and fair elections were no 
longer possible. This form of political control entrenched an economy that was heavily 
dependent on mineral resources, and as a result, the wealth that the government and elites 
accumulated would come from the diamond industry.5l Additionally, nepotism, the 
practice of favoring one's relations in socioeconomic and political appointments was a 
key problem in that patrimonial systems guaranteed positions of power would be given to 
those with connections to power rather than merit. 52 Stevens was able to dominate Sierra 
Leone's politics through a combination of bribery and intimidation.53 Under the APC's 
reign, affluence was commonly attained through corrupt measures. Stevens' political 
50 Dumbuya, Reinventing the Colonial State, 11. 
5l Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 11. 
52 Denney, "Explaining War," 157. 
53 Hirsch, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 28. 
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system was based largely on extending patronage to a relatively small group of "insiders" 
while intimidating "outsiders" who expressed their dissatisfaction.54 
Similarly, in the provinces traditional chiefs kept in place a strict hierarchy based 
on social class through arbitrary systems.55 Thompson has written, "It was against the 
background of a colonial society used to autocracy in government, that the rulers of the 
new Commonwealth countries were brought up and learned the art of politics. The truth 
is that although they grew to dislike colonial authoritarianism, the emergent African elite 
inherited its legal and administrative superstructure at independence.,,56 
As the mismanagement of state funds became a key feature of governance 
following independence, the declaration of a one-party state in 1978 was a license for 
corruption on many levels. Prior to that, in 1971, the diamond company Sierra Leone 
Selection Trust (SLST) lost 51 percent of its shares to a government takeover. 57 This 
move is said to have paved the way for increased national control of diamond revenues. 
Increase in government revenues failed to generate a corresponding improvement on the 
lives of average citizens as the majority of the profits found their way into private hands 
(i.e. Stevens and his Lebanese associates).58 Davies argues that while macroeconomic 
management is essential to the promotion of economic development, the successive 
Sierra Leonean governments exercised macroeconomic mismanagement, a key feature of 
the patrimonial system of governance blamed for the war. 59 
54 Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction," 206-211; Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 16. 
55 Denney, "Explaining War," 157. 
56 Thompson, Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone, 9. 
57 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 21. 
58 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 21. 
59 Davies, "Sierra Leone's Development Challenges," 2. 
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More evidence of the mismanagement of Sierra Leone's finances surfaced in 
1980, during the country's preparation for the Organization for African Unity (OAU) 
conference. The entire year's budget was spent on the conference that was hosted in 
Sierra Leone.6o This move turned out to be an enormous and enduring burden on the 
country's finances. Denney states that the violence that ensued in the years to come was 
the result of issues related to political, social, and economic issues of equality, 
governance and security.61 Stevens' personal control of revenues destroyed state 
agencies as channels for patronage and made access to Stevens and not the state-the 
primary avenue to enrichment.62 The collapse of state services accelerated inflation and 
resulted in mass impoverishment, thus reinforcing the centrality of Stevens' official 
clandestine economy.63 During Stevens' one-party rule, as Thompson observed, the one-
party Constitution had become a legitimizing device for the introduction of autocratic and 
monolithic system of government dominated by the use of public emergency powers and 
measures as a technique of statecraft. 64 
Students at Sierra Leone's Fourah-Bay College, West Africa's first University 
modeled after western-styled universities, demonstrated against the Stevens' government 
in January 1977, insisting that it was an attempt to make the administration become 
aware of the views and needs of the people.65 The significance of the student political 
participation in Sierra Leone was that student protests were more pro-people rather than 
60 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 25. 
61 Denney, "Explaining War," 157. 
62 Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State," 56. 
63 Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State," 56. 
64 Thompson, Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone, 174-175. 
65 Samuel Hinton, University Student Protests and Political Change in Sierra Leone 
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd. 2002), 59. 
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anti-government.66 When the demands of the students that the president conduct fresh 
general elections and appoint a new cabinet were met, it was a victory for a somewhat 
muted public opinion vocalized by student political action.67 
Student protests in Sierra Leone, particularly in 1977, were apparently successful 
because the participants believed that their actions would force the government to heed to 
the views and needs of ordinary people. Such actions could be construed to mean that 
students were active agents in the process of the "modernization" of their country by 
demanding that the government be proactive in responding to the needs of the people. 
Student participation in political activity was not considered a failure because of their 
efforts and minor successes. However, the greed of the regime they were up against 
proved a greater motivation for governmental officials. 
When Stevens stepped down from the role of President in 1985, he made sure that 
the politics of his dictatorship would extend beyond the end of his tenure with his 
handpicked successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh was chosen as a way for Stevens to 
protect his legacy and not hold him accountable for his malpractices and those of his 
business partners.68 Momoh was widely viewed by the masses as being more 
incompetent than Stevens. He proposed a political philosophy of "Constructive 
Nationalism" that claimed it would put the needs and interests of the nation above that of 
individuals, groups, or factions. 69 Momoh was unable to resolve the issues that were at 
hand between a nation that had been aid-dependent, and the shadow state built on the 
66 Hinton, University Student Protests, 59. 
67 Hinton, University Student Protests, 59. 
68 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 708; Pham, The Global Dimensions of an 
African Conflict, 181; Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State," 56. 
69 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 708. 
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clandestine economy.70 In retrospect, Momoh's reign could be remembered as the period 
of Sierra Leone's complete economic collapse. The lack of formal control of the 
government along with the pressure from the international community to reduce the 
scope and strength of the state were precursors for what was brewing in the country's 
provinces. 
The exercise of political power that was often intimately allied with violence or 
the threat of violence was characteristic of Stevens' regime and left a lasting legacy. It 
proved to be endemic to the country's social, political, and economic structure. The 
corruption, misrule, authoritarian tendencies, and just plain incompetence of the 
successive presidential administrations of Stevens and his protege, Joseph Momoh, 
produced a vicious cycle that drew Sierra Leone inexorably into an abyss.71 
Consequently, the connection between violence and political power found popular 
expressions in civil disobedience, rebel movements and a full-blown war. 
The Emergence of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
When the RUF eventually made its way from Liberia into Bomaru in the 
Kailahun District of Sierra Leone in 1991, Foday Sankoh, leader of the group, announced 
to the world what the group was all about. 72 Sankoh, a former army corporal and 
cameraman, had been a student leader in the 1970s and widespread critic of corruption. 
This was the beginning of his political career, as he witnessed the plundering of 
diamonds and other mineral wealth by Sierra Leone's political and military elite. As a 
70 Boas, "The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule," 709; Reno, "Political Networks in a 
Failing State," 57. 
71 Nicolas Cook, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace, ed. Brett Sillinger (New York: 
Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 17; Pham, Child Soldiers, Adult Interests, 77. 
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result, Sankoh held anti-government views and became increasingly radicalized. After 
losing his job as a cameraman and a brief imprisonment, Sankoh joined a group of Sierra 
Leonean dissidents in Libya, where they were under the tutelage of Col. Muammar AI-
Gaddafi, who was sponsoring "revolutionary" movements. The movement would take on 
a nature of contagion when he later went to Liberia where he joined forces with another 
"revolutionary" leader, Charles Taylor, who would later become President of that country 
after its own bloody civil war. Sankoh eventually returned to Sierra Leone and was one 
of the founders of the RUF. The movement was initially fueled by violent rhetoric 
against the endemic corruption of the APC regime. They called for a "national 
democratic revolution," and put forth that it was their right and duty to change the 
political system that they were under in order for "national salvation and liberation" to be 
achieved.73 They stated that political and economic powers are inalienable rights of all 
people, and called for the building of social structures created by and for the people, 
which could be accomplished by revamping the educational system.74 The movement that 
had initially aimed to bring an end to corruption soon lost sight of its initial goals as 
deprived young men sought to make their own fortunes. 
With its official genesis in the provinces, the conflict quickly expanded, and 
eventually encompassed all parts of the country. The conflict led to major political 
instability, resulting in two coups-in 1992 and 1997-and saw a serious deterioration of 
discipline within the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).75 Rural alienation was apparent because 
73 Basic Document of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, "The Second 
Liberation of Africa," 1989. 
74 RUF/SL, "The Second Liberation of Africa, 1989. 
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civilians sought protection from state security sectors such as the police and military. 
However, according to most reports, elements of the SLA were colluding with the rebels 
throughout the war evidenced by the few battles between the two groups, as well as a 
faction of the SLA briefly entering into a formal political alliance with the rebels after the 
1997 COUp?6 Therefore, people were rendered unprotected because the army soon took 
up arms as another faction. The term "sobel" resulted from this alliance because they 
were viewed as being soldiers by day and rebels by night. The "sobel" formed the AFRC 
with Johnny Paul Koroma as its leader, who would succeed in the 1997 coup that ousted 
newly elected Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.77 Nonetheless, there was still this question as to 
what caused this "sudden" outbreak of war in a country that after independence was not 
viewed as having such a grim future. 78 The RUF's agenda was still unclear despite the 
circulation of The Basic Document, their manifesto. The "revolutionary" declaration did 
not coincide with their systematic attack on civilians. What was evident, however, was 
decades of inept governance that resulted in a neopatrimonial rule, the more recent being 
the corruption of the Momoh regime. These themes of corruption, contagion of conflict, 
and hinterland alienation would find their way into what caused the conflict. 
The goal of this chapter was to provide an historical overview of Sierra Leone, 
emphasizing its immediate postcolonial condition to illustrate how the environment was 
fertile ground for protracted violence to occur. It argued that historical antecedents that 
led up to the war were a result of the colonial experience, and thus, need to be thoroughly 
76 Bellows and Miguel, "War and Local Institutions," 4; Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in 
Sierra Leone, 15; Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 15. 
77 United Nations, "Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone," October 18 1998,8. 
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examined when considering the war's causation as well as the implementation of 
effective reconstruction programs. This chapter has demonstrated that prior to the 
outbreak of violence as led by the RUF, a war had been brewing long before the events of 
March 1991. Next, this study will critically attempt to locate the causes of the Sierra 
Leone civil conflict in a wider context of causes of civil wars in Africa along the lines of 
the historical narrative presented here. 
The following chapters will illustrate that the reasons for the protracted civil war 
tearing Sierra Leone apart all point back to a legacy of British colonialism and the 
struggle by the ruling cliques to rob the country's wealth. Many of the internal problems 
that led to the civil war resulted from the way in which the country was established as a 
British base. The anti-colonial struggles that were common throughout much of Africa 
during the 1950s forced Britain to hand power over, but to a group of powerful elites that 
would plunder the country of its resources. These successive postcolonial regimes, 
specifically Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh's, would establish an environment of 
social exclusion and denial of basic needs to the populace. The RUF formed for a 
number of reasons, one of which being a reaction to the corrupt regimes. 
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Chapter III: 
THEORIES ON THE CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR 
Civil wars and civil strife are but reactions to the pervasive lack of 
democracy, the denial of human rights, the complete disregard of the 
sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment and accountability 
and, generally bad governance.79 - Adebajo Adedeji. 
There are varying theories as to the origin of the Sierra Leone conflict, which 
commenced in 1991 when the RUF launched an attack on the country that lasted until 
2002. A decade of violence at the hands of various actors including, but not limited to 
the RUF rebel group, to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and Civil Defense Forces (CDF) 
incited a myriad of explanations of the origin of the war which resulted in the deaths of 
roughly 50,000 people, displacement of over one million, and amputation, rape, and 
assault on thousands.8o 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the extant literature on the theories of 
causation, illustrate the plausibility of these theories, and critically examine how 
effectively they considered the socio-historical environment of Sierra Leone in order to 
substantiate their assertions. Understanding fully the causes of civil war in specific 
countries is significant for policymakers to address issues of postwar reconstruction in its 
79 Quoted from, Adebajo Adedeji, UN Economic Commission for Africa, quoted in 
Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), 15. 
80 Hala Jaber, "After the Horror, the Day of Justice," The Sunday Times (London: August 
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and Rape" (New York: Human Rights Watch) 1999; International Crisis Group, "Sierra 
Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy" ICG (London: April 11,2001), 
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entirety. The failure to examine fully the root causes of the conflict, or at least to provide 
an historical assessment of the country in question, often times results in the failure of 
local, regional, and international agencies and programs that have been established to aid 
postwar societies. Successes may be apparent in the rebuilding of basic and social 
infrastructures such as roads, homes, schools, governmental buildings and hospitals. 
However, if political instability finds its way into the same nation again, the previous 
issues were most likely not dealt with effectively. Therefore, especially in the case of 
Sierra Leone, it is imperative to understand the historical processes leading up to the war 
from a political, social, and economical perspective because of its importance in causing 
the war. 
The theoretical background is explained also to situate the causes of civil war 
within a context that illustrates them as a continuum of colonialism. This framework 
includes arguments that affirm the need for reconstruction programs to address the causes 
of the civil war with an emphasis on strategies and techniques for achieving peace and 
prevention of conflict rather than providing ad hoc solutions. 
Scholars have approached the question of what causes violent conflict in general, 
and Africa in particular from a variety of perspectives. These schools of thought have 
emerged in an attempt to understand the increasing and unending incidence of civil war 
in Africa. Although some were developed to explain specifically the African 
phenomenon, such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's greed and grievance theory, 
others were developed more generally, such as Mansoob Murshed's assertion that 
ethnicity plays a far larger role in civil wars because of its strong uniting force. Other 
conclusions blame the continent's deteriorating economic platform, control of the 
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environment and mineral resources, ethnic feuds, the legacy of colonialism by creating a 
neo-colonial state, and postcolonial 'revolutionary' youth culture. This chapter explores 
in some detail the various theories and explanations as to the causes of war generally, and 
with specific reference to Africa, and Sierra Leone. The applicability of these claims to 
the Sierra Leone situation is relevant in order to understand fully all the causes of the 
war, hence, the need for their examination in that context. 
Conclusions that have been drawn state that wars result mainly from territorial 
disputes (inclusive of natural resources), religion, and responses to oppression (i.e. unmet 
human needs). In regards to Sierra Leone, there seems to be a wider consensus that 
control of diamond resources was a significant cause of the war. It is a real irony that 
diamonds, a source of great wealth and prosperity, turned out to be a source of acute 
contentiousness among the people of Sierra Leone, resulting in national adversity and 
poverty. A mineral resource that would otherwise facilitate economic growth became a 
detriment, due primarily to the Sierra Leone Selection Trust's (SLST) monopoly over 
ninety percent of its revenues. Its privatization by successive governments contributed to 
its use as a weapon of the civil war. However, it is simplistic to contend that diamonds 
were the primary cause of the war. There were certainly other major dynamics that 
fostered an environment for violent conflict. 
Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War 
Prior to the outbreak of violence, Sierra Leone, a nation that possesses significant 
mineral resources, but has a poorly developed economy,8! experienced a great deal of 
systemic government corruption with its successive regimes after independence, and thus, 
8! Nicolas Cook, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace (Hauppauge: Nova Science 
Publishers, 2003), 17. 
32 
established a character of political violence. Bellows and Miguel argue that the people of 
Sierra Leone responded to this systemic political violence with violence of their own, 
with an increased desire to assert their political rights rather than resignation, hence, the 
formation ofrebel groups such as the RUF.82 Some sources have suggested that the 
country's abundant natural resources may have fuelled grievances there, particularly 
because people were aware that only a small group of political elites were reaping 
benefits of the natural wealth rather than the entire country.83 The main premise behind 
the separation of resources between governmental elites and the larger society is the 
deliberate deprivation of basic needs. lohan Galtung has alluded to such an occurrence 
as "structural violence. ,,84 It is violence embodied by a structure, and "characterized 
politically as repression and economically by exploitation.,,85 
Arguably, the larger Sierra Leonean society endured such a fate. What is clear is 
that the causes of the conflict were complex, and the origins of instability extend back 
well beyond the decade leading up to the rebellion.86 Investigating all of the causal 
factors of war in Africa, specifically the Sierra Leone civil war, is vital in understanding 
ways to successfully implement reconstruction policies. However, in order to locate 
these causes, one must begin with examining the available literature that theorizes what 
causes war in Africa, specifically Sierra Leone. 
82 lohn Bellows and Edward Miguel, "War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone," 
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Diamonds, agriculture and re-building rural livelihoods in the Eastern Province," 
Geography (2005),67. 
33 
The most popular among theories of the causation of African conflicts comes 
from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who have called their theory greed and grievance, 
which presents diamonds as the ultimate source of the fighting. However, Robert Kaplan 
was the first to address the Sierra Leone civil war by positing the intrinsic primitive 
nature of the Africqn people as the source of blame. In his 1994 article from the Atlantic 
Monthly titled, "The Coming Anarchy,,,87 Kaplan argues that underlying "primitivisms" 
of Sierra Leoneans (and African people in general) are what caused the outbreak of 
violence in the country. This "New Barbarianism" that is an inherent element of the 
culture was apparently brought to the forefront due to an environmental breakdown 
through overpopulation and resource shortage.88 In this essay, Kaplan establishes a 
"them" and "us" dichotomy but fails to address the role of the colonial power and that of 
the international community in creating or perpetuating the problems existing in Sierra 
Leone and other parts of Africa. Kaplan does not consider the historical problems of the 
colonial experience and how it continued to impact upon structures of governance in 
Sierra Leone past independence and the attendant impacts on the continent, which 
resulted in neocolonialism. Rather, he places emphasis exclusively on the so-called 
"savage nature" of the African person. Sierra Leone is a prime example of a nation that 
inherited and reinvented its colonial state in the postcolonial era. 89 The author argues 
strenuously in this study that inquiry into the causes of conflict in African nations today 
that ignores the historical experiences of colonial rule is certainly flawed. 
87 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and 
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," Atlantic Monthly 273, 
no. 2 (1994): 44-76. 
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Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler advanced another major theory on the causes of 
conflict in Africa by highlighting problems that were solely due to the economy and how 
they have contributed to civil wars in Africa. Their first paper, entitled, "On the 
Incidence of Civil War in Africa," applied an "econometric model of civil war" to 
analyze the incidence of civil war in Africa. The "Collier-Hoeffler model" of civil 
conflict, as it is commonly known, is in an attempt to evaluate the conclusions drawn by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which concluded that 
Africa is the only region in the world where conflict is on the rising trend.9o Collier and 
Hoeffler found that on average, Africa had a rate of conflict that was very similar to that 
of other developing nations. The difference was, however, in its structure of risk, where 
Africa's economic characteristics generated an unusually high risk of conflict. Yet, the 
high risk factor is offset by social characteristics that generated an atypically low risk. 
Thus, the analysis suggested that the rising trend of conflict in Africa was not the result 
of deep-seated problems within the social fabric of the continent, similar to the 
conclusion drawn by Robert Kaplan. Rather, the authors concluded that it was due to the 
conditional effect of the economic circumstances.9 ) 
Their second paper, entitled "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," continues the 
economic approach to causation evident in the earlier work by focusing on the initiation 
of rebellion.92 This is explained by identifying the motive and opportunity for rebellion. 
90 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook of World 
Armaments and Disarmaments and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999),20. 
9) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (February 2002): 25. 
92 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford 
Economic Papers (2004): 564. 
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Grievance, which includes high inequality, lack of political rights, and ethnic/religious 
divisions in society, are motivating factors for a rebellion; and the opportunity for 
rebellion to occur lies in the chance for financing rebellion. The RUF/SL was motivated 
by the abovementioned grievances, and further by the opportunity for diamonds to 
finance weapons for the war. Greed and grievance are explained as complementary 
forces in discussions surrounding violent conflict in Africa. Similarly, Paul Orogun in 
his article "Blood Diamonds and Africa's Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era" 
holds mineral resources responsible for Africa's civil wars, specifically in countries 
where diamond mining is a leading force. He asserts that some of Africa's most virulent 
conflicts have been characterized and catalyzed by the ruthless struggle for domination 
and control of vital economic resources such as diamonds.93 
Along with these two popular theories is a set of arguments relating to local 
politics in Sierra Leone, rather than abstract ideas about the disintegration of the 
environment, essentialist culture or principal commodities. These views come 
predominantly from anthropologists and those from Sierra Leone who were involved in 
the war.94 They locate the key causes of the war in the systems of injustice and poor 
governance as operated/administered by the central government, as well as the traditional 
chieftaincy system in the provinces. Interviews conducted by Campbell during his time 
in Sierra Leone also lend support to theories on the inefficiency of the government, and 
93 Paul Orogun, "Blood Diamonds and Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era," 
World Affairs (Winter 2004): 152. 
94 Lisa Denney, "Explaining War, Creating Peace: UK-Sponsored Reforms in Sierra 
Leone," Contemporary Review (Summer 2009): 156. 
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the difficulties that ordinary people had in working with natural resources in an honest 
fashion, thus mimicking the governmental protoco1.95 
Lisa Denney does not completely dismiss the greed and grievance based theory, 
conceding that mineral resources are a primary source of conflict. However, according to 
Denney in the case of Sierra Leone, mineral accumulation was used to fund the war after 
its genesis.96 The yearning for diamonds did not initially offset the civil war, but they 
facilitated its prolongation. The RUF forces would make use of diamonds as a financial 
backing for weapons, from the neighboring Liberian leader Charles Taylor.97 Denney 
reminds us that the war in Sierra Leone was fought for several years without major 
diamond income.98 Diamonds were indeed the currency of choice with which the RUF 
used to purchase weapons from the neighboring Liberia (one of the many links between 
the wars in the two countries).99 The diamonds were essentially a means of continuing 
the rebels' struggle, but not the underlying purpose of it. 100 On the strength of its 
findings, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set out to manage the post-conflict 
resettlement and reconstruction programs further supports this assertion. 101 Adebajo 
corroborates this view with the contention that the profits from diamonds were the 
primary factor in prolonging the war, but not the primary cause of conflict. 102 Denney 
95 Campbell, Blood Diamonds, 43. 
96 Denney, "Explaining War," 156. 
97 Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 4. 
98 Denney, "Explaining War", 156. 
99 Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most 
Precious Stones (Westview Press, 2002), 39. 
100 James Rupert, "Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa's Brutal Wars," Washington Post 
(Washington: October 16, 1999). 
101 Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone, Final Report, 2004, 12. 
102 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 80. 
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contends that Sierra Leone's civil war was a direct result of societal factors particularly 
the inept and corrupt governing body of the postcolonial era. 
Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild claim that war, specifically political conflict, 
presents itself in an area because certain ideologies that initiate war is contagious. These 
ideologies are often disseminated through media outlets such as newspapers and the 
radio. According to the authors, the process of contagion is due to the diffusion of group 
conflict from one country to another. Although they assert that conflict is rooted in the 
internal conditions of a particular country, people of different states share ideas, 
commerce, cultural traits, and conflict as well. 103 The authors contend that the process of 
contagion is a specific process of social learning because watching groups in other 
societies organize and engage in political action, stimulates or heightens a sense of 
collective identity. 104 In other words, a group that perceives itself as being a victim of a 
grievous treatment at the hands of its government or another group within the state may 
develop a clearer sense of its own political identity by observing the struggle in other 
countries. Thus, political conflict elsewhere can be instructive as to the means by which 
to pursue collective ends. 
The Hill and Rotchild theory is further substantiated by Abdullah's analysis of the 
character of the RUF. Abdullah also examines how Sierra Leone became embroiled in a 
civil war from a variety of angles. One in particular is that outside forces contributed to a 
social learning of "revolution" that is an integral part of the process of contagion. The 
RUF's ideological leader, Foday Sankoh, along with other Sierra Leonean, Liberian and 
103 Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and 
the World," The Journal of Conflict Resolution (December 1986): 718. 
104 Hill and Rothchild, "Contagion," 719. 
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Burkinabe mercenaries, received training from Col. Gaddafi of Libya on the makings of a 
revolution. 105 Riley supports the theory of contagion by asserting that it was in Charles 
Taylor's strategic interest to assist the RUF in launching their "revolutionary" campaign 
in Sierra Leone. 106 The neighboring failed state of Liberia was at that time in the midst of 
its own grim civil war. Since 1990, the Momoh regime had provided its only airbase to 
the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in Liberia. The organization intended 
to neutralize Liberia's top warlord at the time, Charles Taylor, who would become the 
country's future president. 107 Sponsoring the RUF invasion was said to be Taylor's way 
of retaliating against Momoh. 
Hill and Rothchild further suggest that ethnicity is also a deciding factor in how this 
process of contagion stretches across country limits. Because groups are usually formed 
around ethnic ties, ethnicity shapes the receptivity of domestically mobilized groups to 
outside conflict. This theme of ethnicity as related to violent conflict is shared among 
other researchers. Mansoob Murshed argues that many contemporary civil wars have an 
ethnic dimension, as ethnicity is a strong uniting force. 108 Similarly, Blanton, Mason, and 
Athow contend that African countries that were under the British system of colonial 
administration are positively associated with ethnic conflict. 109 It is to be noted, however, 
that Sierra Leone was, prior to the official arrival of British colonial rule in 1787, 
comprised of different ethnic groups such as the Mende and Temne. The creation of the 
105 Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction," 212; Cook, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace, 
20; Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 6. 
106 Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 7. 
107 Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: the State that Came Back From the Dead," The 
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 149. 
108 Murshed, "Conflict, Civil War, and Underdevelopment," 387. 
109 Blanton et aI, "Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa," 483. 
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Krio ethnic group as colonial elite, however, further fertilized the seeds for ethnic 
tensions. Most of Sierra Leone's l80-year colonial phase illustrated a fundamental 
political cleavage in Sierra Leone between the freed immigrants and anglicized Krio, and 
the multiethnic, multi-religious (Muslim, Christian, and indigenous) inhabitants of the 
country's provinces. In addition to this, the earlier part of the 20th century in Sierra 
Leone also had a small business community made up of Lebanese and Indians. Although 
party political loyalties assume a loose ethnic divide between the predominant Temne of 
the north and the predominant Mende of the south, "Sierra Leone did not experience the 
ethnic fratricide that is often blamed for state collapse in Africa before or after 
independence." I 10 
Abdullah's main premise, however, is that the RUF was comprised of a 
"lumpenproletariat," a term originally coined in Marxist scholarship as a label for the 
poor masses. This "lumpenproletariat" is described as being unruly rural youth, former 
student radicals that resorted to criminal behavior, including violence, in order to achieve 
their goals. I I I Although they received the short end of the stick, as it were, due to the 
inept one-party rule of Stevens' All People's Congress APC political party, they followed 
governmental example and resorted to violence to achieve a 'political' ends. Abdullah 
argues, nonetheless, that the RUF lacked revolutionary theory in their movement. In 
other words, they did not share any of the essential characteristics of ideology, 
organization and discipline, which marked revolutionary movements in Africa or 
110 Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: the State that Came Back From the Dead," 148. 
III Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction," 206-207; Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra 
Leone, 12. 
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elsewhere, except for the use of force to attain power. I 12 It is the greatest irony of the war 
that the very group that RUF attacked, the civilians, was the ones that they should have 
targeted for support if it was revolutionary change they were aiming to achieve. 
The models so far analyzed are only a few of several explanations that attempt to 
define what causes violent conflict in general. Although most of them cannot be used as 
the sole determinant of what caused the civil war in Sierra Leone, they all have 
components that contributed in varying degrees to the war. These models were used 
primarily because theorists such as Kaplan, as well as Collier and Hoeffler were among 
the first and widely known when it came to identifying the causation of conflicts, with 
specific regard to Sierra Leone. The additional theories of ethnicity, corruption, and 
natural resources were included not only because they are popular topics as regards 
causation, but also to illustrate how these are the very same issues that arose during 
British colonial rule in Sierra Leone, as noted in the previous chapter. 
In summation, it can be deduced that elements of ethnicity, greed, grievance, the 
contagion of political conflict, as well as corrupt and inept state governance among 
others, contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone. The historical evidence 
particularly stresses that the conflict originated, in part, from the growth of systemic 
government corruption in the decades after independence in 1961, leading to a severe 
deterioration of state governing capacity. Keefer argues that "normal politics" is a 
determinant of civil war in that politicians do not follow up on the promises that are made 
to the citizens of the country. I 13 Adebajo ties these causes together by stating that 
112 Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction," 222. 
113 Philip Keefer, "Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and 
Democracies," The World Bank Economic Review 22, no. 1 (2008): 1. 
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"political misrule and economic decline of the postcolonial era created conditions for a 
rebel group that was backed by two sub-regional states", that is, Liberia and Guinea-
Bissau. 114 Again, the inference is irrefutable that the conflict was fuelled by contention 
over the control of mineral wealth, particularly diamonds, and other resources. The 
prolonging of conflict was illustrated by regional insecurity and external interference in 
the conflict-notably by the Liberian government, with which the RUF reportedly traded 
diamonds for arms and other assistance. Although the 1991 rebellion in the country was 
ignited by civil war in Liberia, it was essentially the underlying resentments inside the 
country that triggered the insurgency. I 15 All of these elements contributed to Sierra 
Leone's civil war. Based on the theories presented, one can conclude that while there are 
numerous reasons as regards the causes of conflicts, they occur primarily because of 
internal dissensions and dissatisfactions, with external influences as contributing factors. 
114 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), 103. 
115 Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 9. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
THE CHALLENGES OF POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION 
In the aftermath of violent conflict, there is one obvious priority, 
·d· d . 1 116 avO! mg renewe VIO ence. 
- J unne and Verkoren 
This chapter highlights some of the present literature on the postwar 
reconstruction process, and the arguments as to what is needed for effective 
reconstruction in societies emerging from violent conflict. This includes a brief analysis 
of what is state failure and state formation in order to explore the apparent contradictions 
in Sierra Leone's categorization as a "failed state" (and its eventual complete collapse) up 
until its postwar state-building process. It begins by first defining the terms post-conflict 
(used synonymously with postwar in the context of this study), and peace because 
context is essential when drafting policies and programs of development. This is 
followed by what the major post-conflict reconstruction themes are (and should be) in the 
ongoing dialogue. The usage of specific terms coupled with the said goals of post-
conflict reconstruction all need to be taken into account when creating and assessing 
postwar programs of development. 
Postwar Reconstruction: an Overview 
116 Quoted from, Gerd Junne and Willem Verkoren, Post Conflict Development: Meeting 
New Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), 12. 
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The term post-conflict is defined as: conflict situations in which open warfare has come 
to an end. 117 However, these situations can remain tense for years or decades and can 
engage in an effortless degenerative path, reverting back to large-scale violence. Some 
studies have shown that forty-four percent of all post-conflict situations are met with the 
resumption of war within the first 5 years 118, whereas fifty percent of post-conflict 
countries revert back to war in the first decade of peace. I 19 Post-conflict (also postwar) is 
oftentimes used as a synonym for peace. However, more often than not, post-conflict 
societies have experienced a breakdown in the societal structure that makes the security 
sector vulnerable. If security forces (i.e. police and military) are weak, citizens remain 
defenseless if violence is to reoccur. Peace, on the other hand involves not just the end of 
war but the absence of significant residual violence, undivided sovereignty, and a 
minimum level of political openness. 120 Peter Uvin discusses the debate on "positive 
peace" versus "negative peace," which states that peace is not simply when people or 
nations do not fight one another (or in Sierra Leone's case, cease to fight), but the 
existence of cooperation, trust and respect between them in present as wel1. 121 In fact, 
transitioning from civil war to sustainable peace is a complex process. Similarly, some of 
the common assumptions underlying the concept and practice of development is that an 
external source, either regional or international, provides only monetary support for the 
country where aid is needed, also called the "host country", in addition to building or 
117 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development, 1. 
118 World Bank Report, 2004, 8 «retrieved from Junne and Willem, 2005. 
119 Paul Collier et aI, "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy," 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank), 7. 
120 Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi, "Post-conflict Transitions: An Overview," The World 
Bank Economic Review 22, no. 1 (2008): 2. 
121 Peter Uvin, Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi (New York: Zed Books, 
2009),43. 
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rebuilding tangible infrastructures such as roads, hospitals, etc. However, development is 
beyond the minimalist assumption of referencing economic growth, but about improving 
the standard of living for all people in poor countries. 122 In reality, economic 
development itself is no guarantee against violent conflict. Nevertheless, the lack of 
development can be a catalyst for the resumption of violence. 123 Studies have shown that 
development is a precondition for security and economic development might reduce the 
f . I fl· 124 occurrence 0 VlO ent con ICt. 
Violent conflicts at the end of the twentieth century have devastated many 
developing countries and impeded development efforts in which large amounts of human 
energy and money were invested. Primarily in the region referred to as Third World or 
Global South, many countries are actually worse off than they had been when they 
became independent. With every violent conflict, a social order loses part of its ability to 
handle future conflicts in a nonviolent and meaningful way.125 With that said, there is a 
necessity for international as well as local and regional organizations to understand the 
causes of conflict in order for lasting peace to be achieved. Junne and Verkoren assert, 
"Humanitarian organizations rush in but are neither interested in the causes of the conflict 
nor in long-term development.,,126 In actuality, for long-term sustainability of peace and 
growth to be achieved, post-conflict societies need to develop institutions for the delivery 
of public goods, which can only be fulfilled through leaders who are in a position to 
122 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development, 3. 
123 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development, 2. 
124 Rolf Schwarz, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare, 
and Representation," Security Dialogue 36, no. 429 (2005): 437. 
125 Hugh Miall, Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task, in Berghof 
Handbook For Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management), 15. 
126 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development,S. 
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overcome political fragmentation. The formation of stable national coalitions beyond 
immediate ethnic or regional power bases will foster an atmosphere of national unity 
beyond political divides. 127 Therefore, development efforts must take the conflicts 
unequivocally into account. More importantly, planners must speak to the causes of 
conflict in order to find ways to prevent them from reoccurring. Researchers have stated 
that development policies for conflict-torn societies have to differ in accordance with the 
causes of conflict. In other words, there must not be a "one-size-fits-all" approach when 
proposing policies of development in regards to causes of violence. Thus, the challenges 
of post-conflict development differ with the reasons for conflict in general. 
To approach the discussion of post-conflict reconstruction holistically, Junne and 
Verkoren put forward what they term as "four clusters of causes" in order to assess what 
and how postwar programs of development should be implemented. These causes 
include the external or international impacts; the characteristics of the state of the country 
in question; characteristics of society; and individual orientations. 128 
The argument on external or international factor states that the root causes of 
conflict are found outside of the country in question as a result of the remnants of 
colonial rule. Consequently, groups are set up against one another by outsiders. This 
category additionally claims that these hostilities are the result of globalization, which 
exposes the whole societal structure to severe outside competition, subsequently 
aggravating the inner competition for resources. Marda Mustapha further supports this 
theory by holding that Sierra Leone's postwar society characterizes an environment that 
127 Elbadawi, "Post-conflict Transitions," 1. 
128 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development, 7. 
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is emblematic of "structural violence," which is a consequence of not only the internal 
workings of the corrupt government but also the broader impacts of global capitalism. 129 
The next cause addressed involves the characteristics of the state. This involves 
the state being too strong or too weak. A weak state is not capable of protecting its 
citizens who may then turn to sub-national groups and thus, challenge the authority and 
legitimacy of the state. Contrastingly, a state can be repressive, giving rise to resistance. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, the state had begun a downward spiral trend since 
independence because of the oppressive manner of governance adopted by the political 
elites. Additionally, there is Ibrahim Abdullah's analysis that the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone was comprised of "lumpen" youth who had been aggrieved 
by the state and thus turned to sub-national grouping. Consequently, Sierra Leone's 
decline into war fits both of the aforementioned descriptions. 
The third reason is the characteristics of society. This is indicative of economic 
inequalities that lead to class struggle, ethnic cleavages, excessive use of natural 
resources causing quandaries about inadequate means of living, or plentiful resources 
may lead to conflict. The final cause put forward by Junne and Verkoren is individual 
orientations. In other words, "people are divided among different political ideologies, 
different religions, or different languages (culture, images, and customs)". 130 
The fundamental task of post-conflict development is not just rebuilding or 
reconstructing. This may, in fact, lead to recreating the very structures that gave rise to 
the devastating conflicts, and thus create a vicious relapse to violence. The immediate 
129 Marda Mustapha, "Global Inequalities and Peace in Post-War Sierra Leone," 
Unpublished Paper, 1. 
130 Junne and Verkoren, Post Conflict Development, 7. 
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aftermath of these conflicts can create a political window of opportunity in which all 
parties, and more importantly, the state and civil society, agree that basic structures of 
society have to be changed to avoid a recurrence of devastation. Therefore, 
reconstruction and peace-building can succeed only when all the different actors and 
networks are committed to and contribute in peace talks. Civil society groups are key in 
contributing greatly to the moral, economic, and humanitarian reconstruction efforts in 
the country.I3I 
Adekeye also identifies the importance of post-conflict peace-building, and some 
tasks that are involved in this process. These include: 1) disarming and demobilizing 
warring factions; 2) conducting and observing elections; 3) repatriating and resettling 
refugees; 4) rehabilitating and reintegrating soldiers into local communities; 5) 
restructuring and reforming security forces, civil services, and judiciaries; 6) monitoring 
and investigating human rights abuses; and 7) overseeing transitional civilian 
authorities. I32 Similarly, in his book on the aftermath of the Burundian civil war, Peter 
Uvin mentions the post-conflict agenda according to the international community as 
implementing measures for achieving: security sector reform (SSR), demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration (DDR), governance (creation of a democratic polity), 
development (economic growth), and justice/reconciliation. 133 Both scholars take the 
view that political, social, and economic aspects of society should be taken into 
131 Ahmad A. Sikainga and Ousseina Alidou, Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa, 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 2006), 8. 
132 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 19. 
133 Peter Uvin, Life after Violence: a People's Story of Burundi (New York: Zed Books, 
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consideration when looking at countries emerging from war, in an effort to address the 
root causes. 
From 'State Failure' to Postwar State Building 
According to Schwarz, "conflict, state collapse, state reformation, and 
peace-building" (also state building), share a symbiotic relationship.134 In the post-Cold 
War era, conflicts and wars have increasingly been accompanied by state failure and state 
collapse, thus the need for reconstruction that is specific to postwar contexts. Since the 
end of the "medieval order," what the world views today as the "modern state" has been a 
continuous work in progress. 135 The modern state is often compared to, or riding on the 
coattails of the state referenced in eighteenth century literature. However, it is against 
this backdrop that current discourse on the "failed" or "collapsed" state must be 
understood. 136 The attention that has been allotted to state failure and state collapse is 
fascinating to some scholars, considering the disappearance of states is a rare 
occurrence. 137 Nevertheless, this analysis is important to the study and beyond because 
Sierra Leone is one of those "few" cases in which state collapse was eminent, and the 
growing discussion of what constitutes a state, therefore, state failure. 138 
134 Rolf Schwarz, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: the Challenges of Security, Welfare and 
Representation," Security Dialogue (December 2005): 430. 
135 Jennifer Milliken and Keithe Krause, State Failure, State Collapse, and State 
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138 This categorization of full-blown state collapse remains rare, but was seen in cases 
such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo/Zaire, and Albania. See Milliken and 
Krause, State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction, 2. Schwarz also argues 
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Schwarz argues that functional state failure should be distinguished from state 
collapse. The former is defined as a deformation in which the state fails to provide its 
most basic functions to civil society, whereas the latter is where the complete order 
breaks down and a war of all against all emerges. 139 This definition of state failure is 
similar to Johan Galtung's theory of the structural violence, which is the suppression of 
b · d . b h 140 aSIc nee s to socIety y testate. 
The term "failed state" has emerged with its own set of controversies. What is 
oftentimes overlooked is that most of what we know as Western society had undergone 
state formation for centuries, and violence, whether cross border or intra-state played an 
integral part of that process. With that said, the formation of Sierra Leone and other 
African nations into states, when described in Western terminology, should be placed 
within a context of the historical processes of state formation. Consequently, it can be 
argued that because much of Africa has been independent for roughly fifty years this 
process of state formation is not simply due to a "savage African" frame of reference, nor 
to endemic political, economic, and social issues. Because the current dispensation is 
based on technological advancement, Africa is seen as backwards when it can be argued 
that it is experiencing a process that shows very little difference from European states 
when they were forming in the pre-colonial era. 
Sierra Leone was politically independent for roughly six years before the All 
People's Congress (APC) party came to power with Siaka Stevens as its head and 
139 Schwarz, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," 430. 
140 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict Development and 
Civilization (London: SAGE Publications, 1996),93; John J. Hamre and Gordon R. 
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centralized all aspects of the state. Stevens' practices of nepotism and corruption 
undercut the growth of the economy in a manner worse than it was around the immediate 
postcolonial era. 141 As a result, the regime left no room for legitimacy and the country 
was barely a state when it began to indicate characteristics of state failure. As earlier 
elaborated upon, the formal political system was further undermined in the 1970s and 
1980s when Sierra Leone slipped into a one-party system of governance. Citizens were 
experiencing failure from the official states and exclusion from the informal state, which 
was comprised of patronage networks. 142 An element of distrust was established among 
the civilian population in regards to the government. Nonetheless, the role the state plays 
in postwar reconstruction is one of importance because it is from there that national trust 
is to be built. 
The Role of the State in Postwar Reconstruction 
Junne and Verkoren assert, "The growing attention for the role of the state in 
development is also related to the increasingly pressing issues of post-conflict 
development, which is burdened with heavy political problems.,,143 Government officials 
are often met with the task of how to deal with the terror exacted by rebel insurgents 
upon their nations. Before the official end of Sierra Leone's eleven-year war, 
representatives from both the government and RUF met in Lome, Togo from May 25, 
1999 to July 7 of that same year, to negotiate unity between the RUF and the government, 
141 Kieran Mitton, "Reconstructing Trust in Sierra Leone," The Round Table (August 
2009),463. 
142 Mitton, "Reconstructing Trust in Sierra Leone," 463. 
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then headed by President Tejan Kabbah.144 During the negotiations, the RUF sought 
amnesty, ministerial positions in the transitional government for specific members from 
its faction, and the position of Vice-President for its leader, Foday Sankoh. What came to 
be known as the Lome Peace Accord granted the wishes of the RUF, with the exception 
of Sankoh's vice-presidential role. The United States took a behind the scenes role in 
granting amnesty to the RUF. 145 Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met 
with RUF leaders Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma, supporting the immunity that 
the Lome Accord would grant. 146 This agreement later proved abortive because of the 
continuance of the war up to three years after it was concluded. 
Scholars have approached the discussion of peace accords from several 
perspectives. One such response contends that the failure of peace accords has been 
largely due to impracticable assumptions about the person or group's involved motivation 
to play by the rules. 147 Consequently, state leaders make "fatal" mistakes of granting 
political roles to individuals who have committed atrocities. 148 Examples of this include 
Jonas Savimbi of Angola, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Foday Sankoh and the RUF of 
Sierra Leone. These "fatal" mistakes can result in the rebuilding of pre-conflict 
institutions. The reconstruction of pre-conflict political structures may contribute to 
lengthening the conflict, or even resuming the violence, rather than solving it. This is an 
issue due in part to pre-conflict structures often contributing to the causes of the conflict 
144 Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero, "Cut Short for Taking Short Cuts: The Lome Peace 
A~reement on Sierra Leone," Civil Wars (Autumn 2001): 120. 
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because some groups benefited over others, continuing an environment of social 
exclusion. In the case of Sierra Leone with the signing of the Lome Peace Accord, 
civilians who were subjected to violence by the RUF and the smaller actors in the war 
were at a disadvantage. 
The achievement of independence of societies such as Sierra Leone was 
accompanied by significant changes in its political, economic and social structures. 
Sierra Leone's pre-conflict government was characterized by a concentration of power 
among political elites and the few that were part of the masses (patron-client 
relationship). In the pre-conflict society, governmental positions were based on a 
patronage network, and these positions were often given to a specific group of the 
population or people willing to do the biddings of their political predecessors. 
Additionally, government expenditures were regionally concentrated. For success to be 
realized in the post-conflict society, access to government positions has to be open to all 
groups of people, and there should be more stability along the lines of regional 
infrastructure. Moreover, the need for governmental transparency should be among the 
foremost concerns addressed when discussing fostering better relationships between the 
state and society. 
Baker and May address the issues of reconstruction in postwar Sierra Leone by 
examining youth alienation, state corruption, and national reconciliation. They examined 
which external aid programs addressed the underlying factors that predisposed Sierra 
Leone to internal conflict, and measured how effective they are in promoting a level of 
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peace on which to rebuild social and economic life. 149 This issue is of importance 
because one cannot simply rebuild the infrastructure and return to the pre-war condition, 
which was characterized by decades of injustice, corruption and authoritarianism. 150 
According to Baker and May, Sierra Leoneans have affirmed that the two primary causes 
of the war are bad governance and marginalization of youth. 151 Political credibility is a 
necessity when promoting postwar reconstruction. Keefer has argued that when weakly 
credible leaders cannot persuade the majority of their citizens to believe their promises, 
they then enact policies that benefit the few groups that support them. 152 This, in essence, 
promotes an atmosphere of exclusion and a violent cycle wherein the majority of the 
population is not provided with public goods, while the few are experiencing an 
overprovision and encourages insurgency. Ironically, good governance is highlighted as 
a fundamental prerequisite for building lasting peace in a country both before and after 
conflict has ended. 
This chapter has sought to provide a nexus between the causes of war and the 
post-conflict reconstruction setting. The present literature on post-conflict reconstruction 
seeks to connect these postwar strategies and implementation with the original causes of 
war. Its main premise is that in order for countries that have emerged from war to not 
revert back to violence, effective measures have to be put in place by local, regional, and 
international actors that address firstly the causes of violence. The chapter has also 
examined the issues and process of peace building in war-tom societies. This was 
149 Bruce Baker and Roy May, "Reconstructing Sierra Leone," Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics 42, no. 1 (2004): 35. 
150 Baker and May, "Reconstructing Sierra Leone," 36. 
151 Baker and May, "Reconstructing Sierra Leone," 38. 
152 Philip Keefer, "Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and 
Democracies," The World Bank Economic Review (2008): 1. 
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illustrated in the analysis of failed states and post-conflict state building, in particular 
ways in which a society develops the state institutions. 
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CHAPTER V: 
POSTWAR SIERRA LEONE: INSTITUIONAL AND SOCIETAL REFORM 
This chapter analyzes a few of the post-conflict reconstruction programs in Sierra 
Leone in light of the major causes of the war with particular emphasis on the postwar era 
from 2002 onward. So far, the weight of available evidences have shown that the Sierra 
Leone civil war was precipitated by governance issues, the inability of the government to 
respond to the people's needs and expectations, especially in regards to the rural 
populations. This process of exclusion led to the marginalization of rural youth-
amongst whom aggravation and discontent festered. This fueled the incessant need for 
the country to be placed back into the hands of the people; however, the greed for Sierra 
Leone's alluvial diamonds and other wealth producing natural resources became a 
primary determinant for why the war continued for a decade. 
Some of these programs and organizations were established prior to the war's 
official end. However, they are just as important as those that intervened in the postwar 
context. Such programs include those implemented by international interventionists like 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and regional assistance such as 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). More 
local organizations such as Children's Learning Services (CLS) were created to address 
the issues of inadequate schooling and the question of what to do with former child 
combatants. Additional programs created by Great Britain that address national security 
because of its importance in the immediate postwar context are examined as well. 
56 
While the civil war in Sierra Leone formally began with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) invasion of the country on March 23, 1991, and officially ended with the 
United Nations (UN) declaration of the cessation of hostilities on January 18,2002,153 the 
small West African nation did not immediately become a symbol of peace. On the 
contrary, Sierra Leone was considered a failed state and questions as to proper 
implementation of postwar recovery efforts were posed. The UN along with other local, 
regional, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was brought into 
Sierra Leone to establish programs that would address the country's failures. These 
included programs for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts; 
rehabilitation of former combatants; educational and healthcare reform; state building 
through reinvigorating of old institutions and establishing new ones; and addressing 
issues of national security through restructuring of the military and police, among others. 
Even though the war officially ended eight years ago, the study has shown that arguments 
still abound as to what actually caused the conflict, and thus what measures are now 
needed to ensure peace and progress towards sustainable development. 
There have been numerous efforts to improve Sierra Leone, from various local, 
regional, and international actors. Great Britain, its former colonial power, specifically 
has been in the lead among other international interventionist actors. 154 At the same time, 
very little is documented about how well these processes of reconstruction have aligned 
with the root causes of the conflict. This study has sought to fill in that gap. 
153 J. Peter Pham, The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leone Tragedy: Child Soldiers, 
Adult Interests (New York: Nova Sciences Publishers Inc, 2005), xix. 
154 Lisa Denney, "Explaining War, Creating Peace: UK-Sponsored Reforms in Sierra 
Leone," Contemporary Review (Summer 2009): 153. 
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Post-conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone 
Before and after the war ended on January 18,2002, Sierra Leone received 
support from international donors to aid post-conflict reconstruction efforts. These 
international donors included but were not limited to, the World Bank, United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the European Commission, and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP).ISS It is, however, important to mention the initial 
hesitancy of the World Bank in helping Sierra Leone near the end of its war. Dreher et. 
al. argue that membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) influences the 
World Bank decisions on whether or not to intervene on behalf of a country as regards 
funding for security issues. IS6 As the study will later show, the UK's involvement in 
Sierra Leone was largely to reform the security sector and this was predicated on their 
position on the UNSC. 
UNAMSIL has been described as a model peacekeeping mission, and at its peak 
in 2002 was the largest and most expensive UN mission on the ground in one of the 
smallest nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. ls7 Although British intervention is seen as a 
"success," regional actors, too, led in efforts to manage the conflicts in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau. Adebajo contends that the regional approach is important in 
conflict management because of the interdependent nature of security issues. IS8 This was 
especially important in Sierra Leone's case due to the spillover effect from Liberia's 
ISS Denney, "Explaining War," 158. 
IS6 Axel Dreher et aI, "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on 
the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" Journal of Development 
Economics (2008): 1. 
IS7 'Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: the Story of UNAMSIL (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2008), 111. 
IS8 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 18-19. 
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brewing civil war. Therefore, the intervention of international NGOs was necessary to 
complement the efforts of the local and regional organizations that were already on the 
ground. 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Among the regional interventionists involved in attempting to establish peace in 
Sierra Leone was ECOW AS. ECOWAS is a regional group consisting of fifteen 
countries that was founded in 1975. The countries that constitute the organization 
include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 159 While 
their mission is the promotion of economic integration in areas pertaining to energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, etc., their mission in Sierra Leone with their monitoring 
group (ECOMOG) was to bring peace to a conflict that had spillover effects. 
ECOW AS's intervention in Sierra Leone was to contain the crisis. The organization 
came in with a six-point peace plan to return Constitutional Governance to Sierra 
Leone. 160 These goals included: 
1. Cessation of hostilities 
2. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of combatants 
3. Commencement of humanitarian assistance 
4. Return of refugees and displaced persons 
5. Restoration of the Constitutional Government and broadening of the power base 
6. Immunities and guarantees 
159 The ECOWAS Commission, "Member States," <retrieved from www.ecowas.int>, 
May 52010. 
160 ECOWAS, "Economic Community of West African States Six-Month Peace Plan for 
Sierra Leone," October 23, 1997. 
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After the coup in 1997 by Major Johnny Paul Koroma against the democratically elected 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, Nigeria sent 700 troops and two naval vessels that were 
originally a part of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia's civil war. 161 The intervention 
initially failed to remove Koroma from power, and successive events would lead the 
organization from peacekeeping mission to another faction of the war. It was not until 
February 13, 1998 that ECOMOG succeeded in removing the military junta from power, 
and returned Sierra Leone to the hands of the elected President. 162 
The United Nations Involvement 
In October of 1999, the UN Security Council established the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as mediator to cooperate with the Sierra Leone 
Government and other parties, namely the RUF, in implementing the Lome Peace Accord 
and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
of former combatants. Initially the Security Council ensured that 6,000 military 
________ ¥pe""r'-'>s"'onunwe"")--<awDLUd'--'2"'-'6.n.OL-mUlilitary observers take part in this mission. -One year late-r, tHe 
mandate was revised to include additional tasks. The military component was expanded 
to 11,000 personnel, as well as the increase in civil affairs, civilian police, and 
administrative and technical components. 163 Three months later, in May of 2000, the 
Security Council increased the military personnel to 17,500. 
The UN's peace-building framework was strengthened with the creation of the 
Peace-building Commission in 2005. The Commission was created with the goal of 
creating a structure that can help countries consolidate peace, avoid relapse into conflict 
161 BBC News, "ECOMOG: Peacekeeper or Participant," February 11, 1998. 
162 Howard W. French, "Nigerians Take Capital of Freetown as Junta Flees," New York 
Times (February 14, 1998). 
163 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1289, February 2000. 
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and lay the foundations for sustainable development. 164 The Peace-building Commission 
is mandated to "bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on 
and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery; and to 
focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for 
recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to 
lay the foundation for sustainable development.,,165 The Commission recognized that "as 
long as Sierra Leone remains susceptible to a possible resumption of violence, it is in 
d f . d· . I . ,,166 nee 0 sustame mternatIOna attentIOn. 
Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State to 
Improve People's Lives (ENCISS) is an organization that focuses on improving the 
boundary among state and non-state actors. ENCISS was conceived by the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) and is managed by CARE Sierra 
Leone. One of its primary roles is to promote good governance in Sierra Leone. It began 
in 2005 with the view to creating a link between government and civil society for the 
reduction of poverty and the fulfillment of people's rights in Sierra Leone. This has been 
done through increasing the capacity of representatives to participate in civil society 
organizations, contributing to and monitoring the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and 
strengthening the capacity of the government of Sierra Leone to engage in constructive 
dialogue with civil society within specific frameworks. 
The Anti-Corruption Commission 
The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established by act of parliament in 
164 Global Witness Report, "Peacebuilding Omission," October 2007,3. 
165 Global Witness, "Peacebuilding," 3. 
166 Global Witness, "Peacebuilding," 3. 
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2000 to promote governmental accountability and restoring relationships with the state 
and the populace. The ACC is responsible for investigating alleged corruption, advising 
government departments and agencies on appropriate changes in their procedures and 
practices, educating the public and enlisting its support in the fight against corruption. 167 
The ACC is the result of the DFID's postwar partnership with the government. Their 
first National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) was published in 2005 with a focus on 
the root causes and public perceptions, priority areas for tackling corruption and policy 
recommendations for reducing risk in different sectors of government. 168 Initially, failure 
of the ACC to act on its reports resulted in a revised draft of their NACS in 2008. This 
draft includes statutes that are more inclusive of public perceptions of corruption. 169 
Similarly, in his inaugural address, Present Ernest Bai Koroma stated that "corruption is 
not only a matter for the leaders and heads of government institutions; it is equally a 
matter for everybody ... " This was the main theme of his presidential campaign of 
"constructive nationalism. ,,170 
Reintegration of Combatants 
The chief problems among most organizations were the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. DDR programs were set 
in place prior to the war's end. l7l The DDR process, which is a standard component of 
UN peacekeeping maneuvers, involves the peaceful disarmament of ex-combatants, the 
167 International Crisis Group Africa Report N 143, "Sierra Leone: A New Era of 
Reform," July 31 2008, 17. 
168 Government of Sierra Leone, "National Anti-Corruption Strategy," February 2005. 
169 Government of Sierra Leone, "National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2013," May 
2008. 
170 President Ernest Bai Koroma, Inaugural Address, November 152007 from ICG Africa 
Report, "A New Era of Reform," 20. 
171 Olonisakin, UNAMSIL, 41. 
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demobilization of armed groups, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into society.172 
Provisions for disarmed combatants included job training that would fit them for 
alternative employment, scholarships and grants to fund education, access to education at 
all levels made available to all combatants, and assistance to facilitate reintegration into 
communities. I 73 Vocational skills in hairdressing, tailoring, carpentry, blacksmith skills, 
and livestock rearing were also included in the rehabilitation and reintegration project. 
This training was extended to returning refugees as well. The DDR process in Sierra 
Leone had a total of three (3) phases, the first of which began on September 1998, and 
lasted until December 1998. The second phase took place from October 1999 until April 
2000; and the third phases lasted from May 2001 until January 2002. 174 
Even though there is a general consensus that DDR programs have been successful, 
it has also been argued that these programs fail to take into consideration an important 
demographic of participants in the war, whether they participated willingly or by force. 
The fact that females participated in the war as combatants is sometimes ignored, due to 
titles given to female soldiers such as "dependents," "camp followers," and "bush 
wives."J75 This categorization and subsequent dismissal of the holistic female experience 
that is based on prescribed gender roles results in the subsequent disregard of female 
combatants and their agency, but also their place within post-conflict policy making. As 
a result, female ex-combatants were not properly reintegrated into society. However, 
172 Olonisakin, UNAMSIL, 54. 
173 ECOWAS, "Elaboration of the ECOWAS Plan," June 1997. 
174 United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, 
Country Program: Sierra Leone, 
http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60#top. 
175 Megan MacKenzie, "Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the 




oftentimes women and girls ex-combatants who had been subjected to rape and forced 
marital relations were not always welcomed into their communities, with ideas that they 
had not resisted enough, or the assigned identity of mothers of "rebel children."I76 
Without justice, recognition of the crimes or effective programs to ensure their 
rehabilitation, without help to rebuild their lives or steps being taken to ensure that they 
are protected from future crimes, the suffering of the women and girls continues. 177 
The presumed dichotomy between "proper" versus "traditional" becomes an issue 
when discussing ways to reintegrate former combatants. Researchers have put forth other 
methods of reintegrating ex-combatants that rely solely upon traditional--Iong established 
traits of a culture--mechanisms. Mamdani describes them as the "treasure trove of 
customs" in which people find conciliatory rituals and expressions that can be adapted to 
facilitate integration. 178 These traditional forms include acceptance of ex-combatants 
back into the community from which they came and forgetting the past. Such rituals 
include cleansing ceremonies to appease the ancestors after offenses have been made, or 
simply forgiving those that caused violence. 179 Strovel argues that while traditional 
forms of reintegration are acceptable and should be taken into consideration during 
policymaking, these "traditionalist" views lack mechanisms for building trust within a 
176 Amnesty International Report, "Sierra Leone: Getting Reparation Rights for 
Survivors of Sexual Violence," November 1 2007, 3 
177 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparation Rights," 2007, 3. 
178 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001), 277. 
179 Laura Strovel, "There's no bad bush to throwaway a child: tradition-inspired 
reintegration in postwar Sierra Leone," Journal of Modem African Studies (2008): 306. 
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community and, therefore, are unlikely to enhance responsive forms of reconciliation. 180 
She further states that these traditional forms of reconciliation have a romantic and 
practical appeal, but can reinforce the very tensions that lead to the war in the first 
place. 181 
On the other hand, Shaw contends that Western forms of restoration, such as the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone, are helpful for some 
societies, but fail to take into consideration traditional forms of resolution that already 
exist. She asserts that most ordinary people of Sierra Leone prefer the 'forgive and 
forget' approach when dealing with former combatants. 182 These approaches to reform 
civil society are among several "formal" and "informal" programs that have been 
established. Other programs address national security issues that affect the citizens of 
Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, in the case of Sierra Leone, it can be argued that 
international and more traditional efforts were needed considering the failure of regional 
organizations such as ECOMOG in ending the violence both during and after the war's 
end. 
The reintegration of former combatants into society was done with relative ease, 
due primarily to the phased approach of the program that lasted over four years. Hence, 
Sierra Leone's DDR program is viewed as a great success and one to which other 
countries experiencing a similar fate should look to as a model. Some of the recorded 
successes include the establishment and management of several disarmament and 
demobilization centers in collaboration with key implementing partners across the 
180 Strovel, "There's no bad bush to throwaway a child," 307. 
181 Strovel, "There's no bad bush to throwaway a child," 321. 
182 Rosalind Shaw, "Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from 
Sierra Leone," United States Institute of Peace Special Report (February 2005): 1-12. 
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country; disarming and demobilizing over 71,000 ex-combatants; economic reintegration 
through the provision of vocational skills; and social reintegration measures that 
d '" d '1" h' d 183 promote lorglveness an reconci latlOn were ac leve . -
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the reason for the relative ease with which 
factions of the war returned to wider society was that the conflict was not caused by 
deeply entrenched ethnic, political, or regional divisiveness, one misconception as to the 
root causes of the war. 184 Rather, victims of violence and those pushing for peace also 
shared the grievances for which many combatants claimed to be fighting, namely, 
frustration with the government and leaders, who were seen as instrumental in nurturing 
the conflict. Reintegration of former combatants is significant in the immediate postwar 
context because it is more likely for individuals to revert to smaller scaled crimes such as 
petty theft and armed robbery if not reintegrated within the framework with which the 
d . 185 programs eem appropnate. 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
NGOs were established or beseeched to aid Sierra Leone during and after the war. 
These organizations were used to address issues pertaining to misuse of natural resources, 
health care for women and children, promotion of democracy, gender equality, human 
rights, and the rule of law; to enhancing the interaction between civil society and the state 
for improvement of lives. 
183 United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa and the Government of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and 
Stability in Africa," Conference Report (June 2005): 22-23. 
184 Kieran Mitton, "Reconstructing Trust in Sierra Leone," The Round Table (August 
2009),464. 
185 Country Report, "Post War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone," The Courier ACP-EU, 
2001, 77. 
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Global witness is one such NGO that campaigns against the misuse of natural 
resources to fund corruption and conflict. 186 Their work has recorded information 
pertaining to countries such as Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Their "voice against warlordism and corruption" led 
to the creation of the Kimberley Certification Process (KPCS), a project that screens the 
production and trade of rough diamonds. 187 According to KCPS, rough diamonds is 
another term for uncut and unpolished diamonds, which are used to finance conflict 
aimed at undermining governments. 188 The KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its 
members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as 'conflict-free' and 
prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade. 189 The role of Global 
Witness in Sierra Leone is to ensure that United Nation's Peace-building Commission 
integrates the need for natural resource management as part of their strategies. 190 They 
contend that because the international community has recognized the prominent role 
natural resources played in sustaining the war, management is a necessity for peace. 
Another international NGO is Search for Common Ground, which has its 
operations in various post-conflict zones across Africa. SFCG's has been involved in 
Sierra Leone (and the neighboring Liberia) through independent media studios, thus 
making media a powerful tool for peace. 191 The "Talking Drum Studio" (TDS) was set 
up by SFCG to use media as a principal tool for peace-building and create the 
186 Global Witness Report, "Peacebuilding," (2007), 1. 
187 Global Witness Report, "Peacebuilding," 1. 
188 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Document, Section I, 2003, 3. 
189 KPCS, Section II, 6. 
190 Global Witness Report, "Peacebuilding," 2. 
191 Lena Slachmuijlder, Unsung Heroes: Studio Ijambo in Burundi (London: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2005), 205. 
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opportunities for transforming conflict. The studios are comprised of teams from various 
ethnic backgrounds who stimulate national dialogue around critical issues through the 
radio broadcasts, print articles, and videos and use a "common ground" approach, while 
searching for appropriate solutions for all stakeholders. 192 The organization's multimedia 
outlet became a platform for youth issues in particular. Another form of media and 
advocacy that was used in postwar Sierra Leone involved the international NGO 
WITNESS. The organization worked with local human rights advocates to film the 
documentary "Operation Fine Girl" to shed light and give voice to the women who were 
sexually terrorized during the civil war. 193 
Children's Learning Services (CLS) is a local NGO that was established by 
Emma Kamara in order to equip school-aged children with conflict resolution tools, 
operating on the notion that peace-building is something that is learned and thus, must be 
taught. 194 The organization was founded in 2001, and has a threefold goal: provide 
quality basic education, peace-building, and nutrition security. 195 This includes 
addressing their emotions through trauma-healing exercises. Additionally, noting that 
food insecurity can be a source of conflict (denial of basic needs), CLS shaped its 
program so as to link community food production and school feeding programs for 
communities that cannot afford a meal for a schoolchild. 
192 Slachmuijlder, Unsung Heroes, 205. 
193 Sam Gregory, Operation Fine Girl Exposes Sexual Violence: WITNESS in Sierra 
Leone (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), 193-194, http://www.witness.org. 
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United Kingdom's Involvement 
Of all the countries that were members of the UN Security Council, Sierra 
Leone's former colonial power, the United Kingdom (UK) was the only one to 
demonstrate a sustained interest in the country's postwar state building process. l96 It is 
important to mention the initial hesitancy of the World Bank in helping Sierra Leone near 
the end of its war. Dreher et. al. argues that membership on the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) influences the World Bank decisions on whether or not to intervene on 
behalf of a country as regards funding for security issues. 197 The United Kingdom's 
involvement in Sierra Leone was largely to reform the security sector and this was 
predicated on their position on the UNSC. 
The UK committed to help reform Sierra Leone by signing a ten-year 
memorandum of understanding with the Sierra Leone government committing itself to 
development assistance. 198 Since it was the UK that provided the most aid for 
development programs in postwar Sierra Leone, its mission primarily addressed issues of 
national security within the nation. Civil society organizations worked in conjunction 
with the UK in reforming the security sector because cooperation between the two would 
contribute to the prevention of internal and external threats. 199 The UK made it clear that 
"without establishing effective civil control over accountable and effective armed forces, 
196 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 80. 
197 Axel Dreher et aI, "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on 
the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" Journal of Development 
Economics (2008): 1. 
198 Olonisakin, UNAMSIL, 125. 
199 Rosalind Hanson-Alp, "Civil Society's Role in Sierra Leone's Security Sector Reform 
Process Experiences from Conciliation Resources' West Africa Program," Security 
System Transformation in Sierra Leone (1997-2007) Working Paper Series (October 
2008),6 
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long-term peace and stability would be difficult to achieve and sustain.,,200 During 
Stevens' regime, he purposefully destabilized the security sector (i.e. police force and 
military), thus decreasing its legitimacy and forcing members to engage in small-scale 
corruption. Denney contends that this particular focus of the UK was its way of tackling 
the cause of the war first hand?OI Some of these UK-sponsored reformation efforts 
include the Sierra Leone Police, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Central 
Intelligence and Security Unit, Office for National Security, Public Sector Reform Unit 
and local government reform.202 Police reform was one of the initial priorities due to the 
need for internal stability and order. Family Support Units (FSUs) were established to 
help women and children who had been victimized by the war. Each unit was concerned 
with the issue of postwar domestic violence committed against bush wives who were 
trying to leave their husbands who were for the most part former combatants, and had 
forced them into involuntary marital relationships. These units provided a two-fold 
function of police investigation and social welfare. 
The Office of National Security (ONS) was also a primary reform project of the 
UK. This was a necessity because one of the antecedents to the war was poor 
communication between the Provinces and the Capital. ONS, therefore, set up Provincial 
and District Security Commissions. This brought together local representatives from the 
military, police, fire service, immigration department, UN, and other relevant actors to 
200 Hanson-Alp, "Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone," 2. 
201 Denney, "Explaining War," 160. 
202 Denney, "Explaining War," 158. 
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discuss security.203 The purpose of these committees is to ensure that early warning 
systems are in place at the grassroots level. 
Justice reform came through the Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP). 
This sought to improve prisons through activities including refurbishing existing juvenile 
detention facilities and establishing new ones. Additionally, due to Sierra Leone's dual 
legal system, the customary legal system and the inherited British legal system, JSDP 
engaged in both systems because the former is the principal national provider of issues 
pertaining to justice and is more likely to have a larger impact on the lives of the Sierra 
Leonean people.204 
While the UK has provided much support to Sierra Leone's postwar society, there 
are still major problems to be confronted by the country. One primary concern is that 
Sierra Leone's national budget is still largely donor dependent, meaning that the 
government's capacity to fund any type of assistance itself is inadequate.205 Olonisakin 
wrote, "The infrastructure of the country and institutions of central government had 
effectively collapsed during the conflict, such that the government lacked the proper 
capacity to address even basic needs like health and education. There was growing 
recognition that a failure to address some of the root causes of the conflict, such as 
poverty and a lack of opportunity, risked undermining the investment of the international 
community.,,206 Several years later, the country's infrastructure remains scarcely 
improved. An additional concern is that some of the programs are set to finish their 
203 Denney, "Explaining War," 159. 
205 Denney, "Explaining War," 160. 
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course in Sierra Leone in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The fragility of peace and security 
and the public confidence in the police and military is still weak, although improved.207 
This chapter presents some of the relevant postwar reconstruction programs and 
policies in Sierra Leone. It sought to examine some of these efforts to illustrate their 
various roles and how they fit within the context of the causes of war. The assistance of 
international actors was also mentioned to illustrate that the reconstruction work that has 
been done in regards to postwar Sierra Leone is due largely in part to the efforts of 
international donors. Next, an examination of a few of these postwar reconstruction 
programs is appraised in order to assess how well these projects have addressed the major 
root causes of the war. Sierra Leone and other postwar societies need to tackle the 
problems with its governing bodies first hand, particularly issues of corruption and 
funding. The problem of the gap between the government and society is part of what 
caused the war in Sierra Leone. This is an issue that policymakers need to deal with in 
order for peace to be an intrinsic part of the society for decades to come. 




In the first United Nations Peace-building Commission country-specific meeting 
in October 2006, the government identified four key peace-building needs where further 
efforts are required, both to address the root causes of the conflict and to lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace and development.208 They include youth employment 
and empowerment; justice and security sector reform; consolidation of democracy and 
good governance; and capacity building. 
The main contention is that in order for post-conflict societies to achieve a lasting 
peace, efforts need to be made to address what caused the violence, and thus, prevent 
history from repeating itself. Indeed, we should in the conduct of human affairs at all 
times be influenced by the precept that history teaches us to learn from the errors of the 
past rather than repeat them.209 According to Lisa Denney, UK-sponsored reform efforts 
can be seen to have focused on issues of governance, on the basis that these issues 
constitute the root causes of the war.210 Recognizing the other major causes of the war as 
208 For additional information see the Sierra Leone Compact, " The United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission and the Republic of Sierra Leone Frameworkfor 
Cooperation: Building on Progress" First Draft, available at: 
http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/issues/1735?theme=a1t4#developments. 
209 Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (Lanham: 
University Press of America, Inc. 1997),250. 
210 Lisa Denney, "Explaining War, Creating Peace: UK-Sponsored Reforms in Sierra 
Leone," Contemporary Review (Summer 2009): 153. 
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rooted not only in governance structures, but in the deprivation of basic needs (such as 
health care and education) among the masses that resulted in large-scale marginalization 
especially among youth, opens the possibility for change. 
End of War 
Following the intervention of the international community, the official cessation of 
hostilities in Sierra Leone after a decade of war came with then President Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah's declaration on January 18,2002 that the war was finally over with the words 
"di war don done.,,211 Since then efforts have been made to ensure that the peace is 
sustained to enable the country to develop and rebuild communities devastated by the 
war. These efforts, as detailed in the previous chapter include but are not limited to, the 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs, security sector 
reform (i.e. restructuring and legitimizing military and police), restoration of democratic 
governance (i.e. Presidential and Parliamentary elections), health care and educational 
availability for victims of war (which includes for the most part the general populace), 
and the Anti-Corruption Commission. 
Postwar transitional elections were conducted on April 141\ 2002, soon after that 
came the President's declaration of the official end of the rebel war. President Kabbah 
was re-elected by almost a landslide, with over 70 percent of the popular vote.212 After 
the elections, Kabbah promised to do all in his power to alleviate the sufferings of the 
people. Regrettably, however, many of the specific promises have remained virtually 
unfulfilled, in the minds and opinions of many Sierra Leoneans, especially the youth, 
211 Speech by the President of Sierra Leone Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, "Address at Ceremony 
to Conclude the Disarmament Process," January 182002. 
212 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, "Sierra Leone Announces Results of 
Elections," May 20, 2002, http://www.electionguide.org/country-news.php?ID=192 
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who constitute over 60 percent of the country's population.213 Successes during his 
administration include the improvements in security, public financial management, 
restoring elected local government, establishing commissions, secretariats, task forces, 
and committees to formulate development policy in order to manage its 
implementation.214 Yet, with progress in these areas comes disappointment in others. 
For instance, corruption at the national level was still suspected by the Sierra Leone 
population.215 According to a report by the UN Secretary-General, the general consensus 
as to the Government's inability to deliver basic services or respond to the needs of the 
populace was due to corruption and mismanagement of public resources.216 Corruption, 
being one of the root causes of the war, provides an atmosphere of tension among the 
people and a sense of distrust for the government. Major promises such as jobs 
especially for the youth, the construction of a bridge from Freetown to Tagrin Point (a 
deep-water port that lies on the opposite side of the Freetown harbor) and the provision of 
electricity for the overcrowded capital, have remained unfulfilled. It appears as though 
life for the average Sierra Leonean has changed little since the end of the war. 
Problems of War versus Prospects for Development 
Four major themes emerged among the official documents and reports concerning 
the problems that led to the civil war in Sierra Leone, and postwar strategies of 
development. These include: alienation versus youth employment and empowerment; 
213 International Crisis Group Africa Report N 143, "Sierra Leone: A New Era of 
Reform?" July 31 2008, 2. 
214 ICG Africa Report N 143, "A New Era of Reform?" 2008, 2. 
215 ICG Africa Report N 143, "A New Era of Reform?" 2. 
216 "First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in 
Sierra Leone [UNIOSIL)", UNSC S120061269, 28 April 2006, 3. 
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corruption versus justice and security sector reform; leadership failure versus 
consolidation of democracy and good governance; and structural collapse versus 
capacity. 
Problems of Youth Marginalization 
As regards the problem of youth marginalization, the evidence is that little has 
been done to alleviate this problem because of lack of governmental resources. Youth 
unemployment is still rampant. This has led many youths in the Western Area to engage 
in street trading, as hawkers. A small number have found employment as taxi-drivers, 
truck drivers, mechanics, and generator technicians.217 The fact remains that although the 
programs that were implemented to fix the security sector were deemed a success, in 
addressing one cause of the war; pressing issues such as youth marginalization are still 
present. Because education, health and employment opportunities had been reduced to 
minimal standards in the years leading up to the onset of the war, the economic exclusion 
of youth is a widely accepted cause of the civil conflict that brutalized Sierra Leone. The 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was able to attract volunteers among the youth not 
because they were inclined to violence, but because they lacked social incentives and 
were economically and politically marginalized by the state following a widespread 
poverty and the failure of state institutions. However, it should be noted that a large 
number of these marginalized youth were drugged and forced to take up arms during the 
war. 
One of the greatest failures of state building in Sierra Leone has been on the 
economic front. The UNDP Human Development Index ranks Sierra Leone 176th out of 
217 Sierra Leonean Official, Interview with Sierra Leonean Official, April 182010. 
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177 countries in the world, and life expectancy in the country is only 41 years. 
Development indicators for Sierra Leone are frighteningly stark with 70 percent of the 
population living in poverty.218 While poverty affects every part of a society, 
unemployed youth are especially impacted by the inability to achieve a meaningful 
livelihood. Three-fourths of Sierra Leone's population between the ages of 18 and 35 are 
unemployed, and the few who do have jobs often are not paid enough to escape the 
clutches of poverty.219 
In light of this, it was no surprise that the rank and file of the RUF was composed 
mainly of urban youth who faced long-term unemployment, criminals, alienated rural 
youth, and young migrants working in diamond-mining districts that experienced 
alienation prior to the war.220 Freeman poses the question: "What is different for youth in 
Sierra Leone today?", and answers this by saying "very little.,,221 While reconstruction 
efforts disarmed former combatants, institutionalized a relatively stable governing 
structure, and expanded and reformed the police and military sectors, the average youth 
still does not have access to education or employment, and is subjected to injustices 
meted out by local chiefs, and embittered by local and high-level corruption. In the 
aftermath of great expectations, the youth have found themselves outside the projects that 
were undertaken to rebuild their country and their futures. Youth are able-bodied, but 
remain unskilled, jobless, and alienated. This unemployment fuels crime and conflict, 
218 
219 Bruce Baker and Roy May, "Reconstructing Sierra Leone," Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 42 no. 1 (March 2004): 226. 
220 "Consolidating the Peace: Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission," 10. 
221 Christi F. Freeman, "The Failures of Post-conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and 
the Threat to Peace," March 2008. 
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which will in turn increase unemployment. The greatest threat to peace in Sierra Leone 
remains the state of the youth?22 The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) 
stated that the issue of youth marginalization and unemployment cannot be addressed on 
a country-by-country basis, but should include a more regional approach. 223 This 
suggestion is not far-fetched, considering one of the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone 
was the spillover effect from Liberia. Nonetheless, some of the primary conditions that 
made the country ripe for an armed rebellion are still present, including lack of access to 
education and health care. 
Education and Health Care Reform 
Mass unemployment is still an issue in Sierra Leone. Yet government officials have 
said jobs cannot come if there is no peace and stability, the achievement of which they 
have prioritized. According to their 2009 Human Development Report, the UNDP 
ranked Sierra Leone 180 out of 182 on its "Health and Education Index."224 Youth and 
young adults, both male and female are subject to discrimination based on age. The 
despair was particularly acute among people over the age of 25, because their options 
seemed limited. Women that are too old for school have sought skill training, farming 
and micro-credit schemes?25 They found that most of the programs run by NGOs were 
aimed at children, while profitable programs were either too costly or did not offer 
daycare, making it unfeasible for those with children to participate. There were plans to 
ensure that more children attend school, with plans to build over 500 primary and 
222 Freeman, "The Failures of Post-conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone, March 2008. 
223 UN OW A Issue Papers, "Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West 
Africa," (Dakar, Senegal: United Nations Office For West Africa, August 2006), 1. 
224 Human Development Report 2009, "Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and 
Development", United Nations Development Program, 202. 
225 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparations," 2007, 14. 
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secondary schools in the country by the end of 2007. Very modest progress is being 
made in the provision of education and health care services. Again, the problem here is 
one of availability and adequacy of government resources. This is another sector in 
which much reliance is being placed on international donor resources and support.226 
Gender issues particularly those of health care, education and little access to jobs 
have become very topical, especially among the victims of violence. While inequality 
based on gender was not highlighted as a cause of the war, inequality and denial of these 
basic needs in general was put forth as what aggrieved the popUlation, particularly youth. 
Women across Sierra Leone have expressed frustration as they discussed their 
desire for work and educational opportunities, and described the limited options available 
to them.227 The high cost of education has caused significant stress, since adult women 
with children (many of them survivors of rape and forced marital relations during the 
war) have the duty of earning enough money to send children to school, while young girls 
with children were at an age where schooling was still a possibility. However, although 
school for primary age children is free, families are expected to supply books and school 
uniforms, which is beyond the means of some. As a result they could not send their 
children to school. Secondary education school fees, ranging from 20,000 -75,000 Ie 
(US$ 7-25) per term, were prohibitive for most families. 
The high level of violence against women in Sierra Leone is a result of the state's 
failure to hold those accountable for rape and sexual violence during the conflict and for 
226 Sierra Leonean Official, Interview, April 16,2010. 
227 Amnesty International Report, "Sierra Leone: Getting Reparation Rights for 
Survivors of Sexual Violence," November 1 2007, 13-14. 
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the continuing violence against women and girls in homes and communities.228 Despite 
the government's obligation to protect women from rape and sexual violence, only a few 
steps have been taken to deal with these crimes. Amnesty International has voiced, 
"Failure to punish perpetrators for both past and current crimes gives the impression that 
they will not have to face the consequences of their actions, ignores the distress of the 
.. d . k f f . I' ,,229 vIctlms, an creates a ns 0 uture VIO atIOns. 
While efforts are being made by the government through the National Commission 
for Social Action (NaCSA) to build health structures in rural Sierra Leone, feedback from 
the chiefs in several communities revealed frustration at the lack of medicine and 
qualified personne1.230 Organizations such as Medecins Sans FrontiereslDoctors Without 
Borders (MSF), which has operated in Sierra Leone since the mid-1980s, continue to 
highlight the poor state of the health sector and the impact this is having on the 
population. Although MSF has helped treat thousands of cases of malaria and through 
their supported health centers, in August 2007 MSF (Operational Center Amsterdam) left 
the country even though many of the health indicators remained very poor, indicating that 
not even basic healthcare needs are being adequately addressed. 231 Denials of these basic 
needs were precursors for the war to begin with. Its presence illustrates conditions that 
caused the war have not been tackled effectively. 
Discrimination in health care is pervasive, with women in Sierra Leone having 
unequal access to basic health services. Although the government adopted a policy in 
2002 exempting pregnant women and other vulnerable groups from paying fees for basic 
228 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparation Rights," 2007,14-15. 
229 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparation Rights," 2007, 13-14. 
230 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparation Rights," 2007, 13. 
231 International Activity Report 2007, "MSF in Sierra Leone," December 2007. 
80 
health services, financial barriers continue to inhibit many women's access to life-saving 
health care. The government has failed to put systems and resources in place to 
implement its exemptions policy - it has not budgeted for it, has not publicized it and 
does not monitor its implementation.232 Women and their families are therefore charged 
for essential drugs, medical supplies and services that the government has stated should 
be free. 233 Sierra Leone has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, with 
2,000 women out of every 100,000 dying in childbirth. There are severe problems of 
access to reliable health information, high rates of harmful traditional practices, and 
insufficient gynecological and reproductive health services available to women and 
girls.234 Greater emphasis should be placed on providing accurate information about 
women's health and the provision of services including access to primary healthcare and 
access to specialized health services. As of April 2010, the Government of Sierra Leone 
decided to supply free health care services to pregnant mothers, mothers who are 
breastfeeding their children, and all children under the age of five. 
Corruption 
To address the issue of corruption, government transparency is imperative for 
trust to be a fundamental part of the postwar society. The government should ensure that 
their audits are transparent, and disseminated in a way that enhances public 
understanding of operations, capacity, and limitations of governmental departments and 
232 Amnesty International Report, "Out of Reach: the Cost of Maternal Health In Sierra 
Leone," September 2009,48. 
233 Amnesty International Report, "Out of Reach," 2009, 48. 
234 Amnesty International Report, "Getting Reparations," 2007, 13. 
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agencies.235 Sierra Leone's pre-conflict government was characterized by a 
concentration of power among political elites and the few that were part of the masses 
(sometimes termed patron-client relationship). In the pre-conflict society, governmental 
rank was often given to a specific group of the population. Additionally, government 
expenditures were regionally concentrated. For success to be realized in the post-conflict 
society, access to government operations and positions has to be open to all groups of 
people, and there should be more stability along the lines of regional infrastructure. 
Sierra Leonean government, and other postwar societies, must tackle the problems with 
urgency particularly issues of corruption and funding. The problems of the breach 
between the government and society that is an element to what caused the war in Sierra 
Leone is an issue that policymakers in Sierra Leoneans need to address in order for peace 
to be an essential part of the society for decades to come. 
According to Sierra Leonean officials, the current government has begun to 
address these causes in terms of adopting policies to prevent their reoccurrence. But the 
evidence shows that progress in this direction is slow and modest and a lot more needs to 
be done at a faster pace. A positive aspect, however, is that much of the effort in this area 
is being undertaken largely with the cooperation of the several NGOs, and other human 
rights agencies currently operating in the country.236 
The Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission is currently addressing the 
problem of corrupt governance. The Commission has been given new powers, chief 
among which is the authority to prosecute persons suspected of corrupt practices without 
the approval of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. The common perception 
235 ICG Africa Report N 143, "A New Era of Reform?" 2008, ii. 
236 Sierra Leonean Official, Interview, April 18, 2010. 
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was that this factor was an impediment to the functional independence of the 
Commission and affected both its legitimacy and credibility. However, under its new 
powers the Commission has been able to prosecute some high profile cases. For 
example, the first Ombudsman of Sierra Leone, a prominent lawyer, was recently 
charged, tried, and convicted of several felonious counts involving fraudulent 
misappropriation of governmental funds. A former Minister of Energy and Power is 
currently before the High Court charged with several counts of conspiracy to defraud the 
Government of Sierra Leone.237 Support of the Anti-Corruption Commission is 
important because it plays a key role in the promotion of governmental accountability. 
Addressing Natural Resources 
Post-conflict reconstruction and poverty reduction strategies for Sierra Leone have 
recognized the potential of natural resource revenue for promoting economic recovery 
and poverty alleviation, and programs to reform the mineral sector have been 
implemented. In 2007, Global Witness found evidence of a persisting pattern of youth 
marginalization and increasing tension due to enduring corruption and mismanagement of 
the mineral sector in the provinces, areas that were historically affected by the conflict.238 
According to the Peace-building Commission (PBC), failure to recognize the role 
of natural resources in Sierra Leone's peace-building strategy from the onset could prove 
a dangerous oversight and undermine peace-building efforts as recognized on numerous 
occasions by the UN. In September 2005, the report of the UN Secretary General on the 
UN Mission in Sierra Leone stated that many of the root causes of the conflict, such as 
corruption, governance, widespread poverty, youth unemployment and the resulting 
237 Sierra Leonean Official, Interview, April 18, 2010. 
238 Global Witness, "Peacebuilding Omission?" October 2007, 7. 
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public discontent, had yet to be addressed.239 The December 2005 report of the UN 
Secretary General submits that the insufficient control by the government over the mining 
sector presented a long-term challenge that required international support long after the 
UN peacekeeping mission left the country.240 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
The causes of the war in Sierra Leone were fully examined and addressed by the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission in their Report published in October 
2004. The seven member TRC took the position that the Sierra Leone government 
should pay reparations to victims of the war, including, amputees, rape survivors, widows 
and children who suffered deprivation, displacement or worse, and other wounded 
victims,z41 Such actions include meeting victims' needs in health, housing, pensions, 
education, skills training and micro-credit, and community and symbolic reparations. 
This decision was made based on the assumption that these needs would restore the 
dignity of the victims, and would help foster conditions necessary for reconciliation. 
The findings and recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), which concluded among others that the causes of the rebel war and reparation for 
victims must be addressed to ensure it is not repeated, have generally not been done by 
the government.242 According to the WARN Policy Brief, many people are angry at the 
inequities that is apparent among the country's postwar society. Victims of the war are 
239 United Nations, "27th Report of Secretary General on UNAMSIL," December 12, 
2005. 
240 UN Secretary General Report, December 2005. 
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allegedly made to live under conditions that are less than acceptable as the perpetrators 
are "courted by the government and let to roam about freely.,,243 The government for its 
part has argued that it has not been able to raise the necessary funds from its international 
partners to fulfill all of the TRC recommendations. Moreover, the issue of dealing with 
former combatants is a controversial one that is influenced by the international 
community and its experts who handle these issues more than national governments who 
are always at the receiving end of policies and assistance. 
While there are many causes of the conflict, both internal and external, The TRC 
specifically noted that weak governance structures, corruption, injustice and extreme 
poverty were the main causes of the war, which resulted in deplorable conditions that 
made conflict inevitable; there would be no lasting peace in the country without 
addressing these issues.244 The Commission proposed the introduction of a new, 
transparent regime in which citizens will have reasonable access to government 
information, where senior public officials disclose their financial interests and where 
government informs people down to the community level what amounts are being spent 
on services and amenities.245 
Conclusion 
African states have long grappled with the need for effective institutions, 
responsive political processes, and responsible leaders. The problems of autocracy and 
difficulties of democratic development are acute. The nature of African societies poses 
important questions about the context of governance, and the roles of civil society. What 
243 WARN Policy Brief, "Challenges of Transition," 2007. 
244 African Union Official Documents, "Overview of the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Report," 4. 
245 African Union Official Documents, "Overview of the TRC," 4. 
85 
happened in Sierra Leone is the result of the choices made by competing political elites 
devoid of overarching and long-lasting national political agendas. These leaders were 
motivated more by the desire to acquire and maintain power than by a general 
commitment to parliamentary democracy and its eventual consolidation as a means of 
effective representative government, which was a part of the immediate postcolonial 
Constitution?46 It may be true that the government has failed to fulfill specific promises 
it made since the end of the war including the failure to fully implement the 
recommendations of the TRC, as a precondition to the establishment of lasting peace in 
the country. The conclusions of the TRC in their 2004 Report is close to that expressed 
by Sierra Leoneans, that the country has returned to politics as usual in the years after the 
war's end.247 
However, it may also be true that the government has accomplished quite a lot in 
the few years since the end of the war especially with regards to the rehabilitation, 
reintegration and reconstruction of areas and infrastructure devastated by the war. In this 
regard government officials are quick to refer to their successes as being directed towards 
the wider picture of recovery for the entire country and not merely on little things. 
Specifically, it is a fact that the demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation progress 
have been fifty percent successful. A significant number of ex-combatants and former 
rebels have returned to their places of origin, especially in the Provinces, and resumed 
their work as farmers, carpenters, traders, and small-scale miners.248 There is also a 
noticeable trend in the country towards orderly and democratic governance and a 
246 Peter Dumbuya, Reinventing the Colonial State: Constitutionalism, One-Party Rule, 
and Civil War in Sierra Leone, (iUniverse, 2008), 15. 
247 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Final Report," October 2004. 
248 Sierra Leonean Official, Interview, April 18, 2010. 
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reassertion of the rule of law. UNAMSIL has been wholly successful in their project. 
They completed their mission and have left the country. Since they left, there has not 
been a resurgence of any armed hostilities in the country. 
While the economy is still heavily dependent on donor funds, a disproportionate 
share of income from diamond mining is still finding its way into private hands, rather 
than Government coffers. By and far, the issue that stands out the most is that of youth 
alienation and unemployment. UN OW A argues that advancing a culture of 
apprenticeship among youths is central to economic growth?49 They further suggest that 
although micro-finance tools and programs frequently deny youth access because they 
are seen as high-risk groups for credit, they should reconsider and include more youth 
participation because it enables self-employment, which is important in West Africa since 
informal activities make up a large portion of the economy?50 Nevertheless, despite 
reintegration programs and small-scaled jobs mentioned, thousands of ex-combatants and 
youths-many of whom were young children at the time of the war and never went to 
school-are unemployed. Even in the years after the war, civilians, particularly the 
younger generation, view the government as "crooked" and nothing for young people but 
misery.251 "Paramount" governmental promises that placed the making the youth useful 
and important contributors to societal development have not been realized.252 In short, 
the "peace" has yet to produce substantial economic surpluses and social benefits for the 
greater part of the population. 
249 UNOWA Issue Papers, "Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity," 25. 
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In a nutshell, it is a fair and accurate judgment, given the local and national 
constraints existing in Sierra Leone, that the various post-conflict reconstruction 
programs have been, at best modestly successful. Therefore, one can predict with a 
certain degree of concerns that if the pace of the ongoing reconstruction programs are not 
hastened to meet the basic needs like educational and health care benefits for the masses, 
along with employment opportunities for the youth who make up the majority of the 
population, available, there is a possibility that Sierra Leone will relapse into another 
cycle of violence. Nearly fifty years after independence, the country experienced 
neocolonial politics that contributed to its bout with violence for over a decade. 
Pervasive corruption and dire failings of the government made Sierra Leone ripe for 
violent conflict and opened the door for conditions where the masses were at a direct 
disadvantage. This study illustrates that internal and external actors alike have indeed 
developed policies and programs. What the country is waiting for, however, is proper 
implementation to address these issues in order to prevent violence from reoccurring. 
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